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The death of the former Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop,
and the collapse of the New Jewel Movement that he led, has not provoked
the intense scrutiny or theoretical debate one would assume the collapse
of the first English speaking socialist revolution in the western hemisphere
would engender. An explanation for this lack of inquiry, according to
this writer, stems from the fact that many commentators have uncritically
accepted the position that the collapse of NJM and the death of Maurice
Bishop was the result of a coup planned and initiated by the Deputy Prime
Minister Bernard Coard. It is argued that all that needs to be known
about the collapse of NJM is already known, since the end result - the
arrest of Bishop and his eventual death - validated the position above.
However, this predominant interpretation, whose most credible spokes¬
men are Don Rojas, Bishop's former Press Secretary and George Louison, a
former member of the party's Political Bureau and Central Committee, has
not been subjected to even a cursory examination.
The problem for this study, therefore, was to test the components of




Using the arguments of Rojas and Louison as points of departure and
identifying the three key issues which emerge as pivotal, the question
of a party crisis, joint leadership and democratic centralism, this study
concludes that not only is the conspiratorial thesis unfounded, but
sufficient theoretical and empirical evidence exists which suggests that
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On March 13, 1979, The People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) -- the
military arm of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) — overthrew the regime of
Eric Gairy in the small island nation of Grenada, The NJM established
what they called a "Peoples' Revolutionary Government" and declared that
the seizure of the state and its transformation was the first step toward
the complete transformation of Grenadian society.
The NJM made progressive steps toward the democratic transformation
of society by introducing structures that increased the participation of
ordinary Grenadians in decisions which affected their lives. Economically,
the NJM attempted to operationalize measures that would lessen their
dependence on the present capitalist division of labor. Although these
changes were minimal, they did suggest however that a process had finally
arrived in the English speaking Caribbean that was much more profound in
its implications than the schizophrenic policies of Michael Manley's
democratic socialism. The Peoples' Revolutionary Government was a state
of a different nature from any other in the region except Cuba. The NJM
and the government were led by young people dedicated to the improvement
of the lives of the Grenadian masses.
However, four years later when the United States invaded the island,
they did not meet a determined and organized people ready to defend the
revolution with their blood; instead they met a confused, demoralized
1
2
people who for the most part welcomed the invaders with open arms. What
happened? The evidence at this point seems to suggest that serious
mistakes were made by the NJM which put into motion the tragic events
leading to the deaths of Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, Jacqueline
Creft, Norris Bain and scores of ordinary Grenadians who were struck down
by bullets fired by its own Peoples' Revolutionary Army. Almost as tragic
as the actual events which led to this bloodshed is the condemnation
these events imply for progressive thinkers who observed and commented on
the Gredndian situation before the violence. Many observers, partly out
of naivety, but mainly out of a propensity for revolutionary romanticism
when it comes to the so-called Third World, did not look closely enough at
the process in Grenada. They did not apply the same critical analysis
reserved for other movements — in particular social movements in advanced
capitalist countries. Consequently, the anomalies and contradictions of
the process unfolding in Grenada were either not recognized or glossed
over on the unstable theoretical grounds of Third World exceptionalism or
ignorant racist patronizing that many employ when it comes to a critique
of Third World social movements.
This latter approach, in particular, is usually characterized by an
over emphasis on external constraints (imperialism) with an uncritical
adulation of the internal process. It also exempts these socialist
experiments from critical analysis and results, especially when these
experiments fail, in the loss of valuable lessons. This loss in the case
of Grenada is dramatically illustrated by the simplistic analysis advan¬
ced by many to explain the events leading to the revolution's collapse.^
Ipor an example of the kind of statements which overemphasize the
"Imperialist" factor in explaining the reasons for the NJM's collapse,
see Chris Searle, Grenada: The Struggle Against Destabilisation (London:
Writers and Readers Cooperative Publishing Society, 1984).
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Many Marxists, who one would assume could offer the most useful and
critical analysis of the events in Grenada, have also, unfortunately,
accepted a position which converges with the position of the United States
Department of State. This position asserts that the internal collapse
of the NJM was the result of a dispute between the hardcore Marxist-
oriented leftists, represented by the Coard faction, and the moderate
social democratics of the Bishop faction. Consequently, even Marxist
analysis has failed to discern the real questions that the collapse of
the NJM poses for socialist theory and practice in the Third World. These
questions center around issues involving the relationship of the party to
the people, the party and the state, democratic centralism, Leninism,
democracy and the problems of building socialist consciousness -- all of
which the NJM attempted to address within the constraints of a rapidly
deteriorating economic situation.
One could argue that these problems are endemic to the process of
social transformation. However, in the Grenada situation they were
exacerbated by the constant provocations of the United States. This in
and of itself is not unique: the United States has on a number of
occasions sought to destabilize nations that were attempting to transform
themselves. But the evidence does suggests that when external pressures
have been applied by the United States and other Western powers on newly
emerging nations it has resulted in severe strains within the society and
the political organization leading the transformation.
In Grenada these external pressures, a weak internal party structure
and the contradictions in the material base of society were all contri¬
buting factors that led to the violent ending of the process. Yet, the
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precise way these factors impacted on the NJM is not clear, nor is there
anything approximating unanimity that these factors had anything to do
with the collapse of the NJM, because a thorough and systemic examination
of the revolution's collapse has not been undertaken. We cannot attempt
in this study to address all the pertinent questions mentioned above, but
this study will lay the foundation for the comprehensive study the Grenada
revolution clearly demands.
This inquiry will operate from the major assumption that internal
contradictions were primarily responsible for the collapse of the New
Jewel Movement, requiring an identification and examination of those
contradictions. This does not mean that we will attempt to separate what
was taking place in Grenadian society from internal party development;
that would clearly be impossible. What it does mean is that in the
dialectical relationship between objective conditions within the country
and internal party developments, the principle contradictions which brought
the revolution to a halt were contained within those internal party
conditions.
The main reason a conceptualization of the NJM's collapse did not
transcend the Coard-Bishop power struggle theory was the absence of the
proper theoretical framework. The NJM, by considering itself a Marxist-
Leninist Vanguard Party provided the only context by which an understanding
of the internal events could be arrived at. Indeed, it appears that the
tension between the NJM, as a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party, and the
political culture in which the NJM found itself may have had a decisive
influence on the events inside the party. The theoretical framework for
this study flows from the principles which animate the Marxist-Leninist
tradition, specifically, the principles concerning the concept of the
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Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party. The Marxist-Leninist Party is seen as
the highest expression of the organized masses in their quest for social
emancipation from capital.2
Because the Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party is seen as the instru¬
ment that provides leadership to the laboring classes in the period
leading up to the seizure of political power, and during the transition
to socialism, the Marxist-Leninist Vanguard demands of itself the highest
levels of discipline and organization. High standards of discipline and
organization are seen as necessary even after the seizure of power by the
vanguard because of the extremely hostile environment in which these parties
find themselves as they attempt to consolidate their power. The concept of
the Marxist-Leninist Party will be further elaborated on in this study, but
suffice it to say at this point that, the high standards of discipline and
the particular modes of behavior one finds in the Marxist-Leninist Party
were not readily understood by most liberal and even Marxist analysts in
their accounts of the NJM's internal dynamics.
If the Grenadian experience has any practical or theoretical
implications for socialist transformation in the Third World, those
implications will not be gleaned from an examination of the external
constraints mentioned earlier, for those constraints are common for most
Third World countries. We feel that the real lessons of the Grenada
revolution reside in the inner workings of the NJM, and for those lessons
we must look inside the revolution, which means inside the NJM.
^Joseph Stalin, Problems of Leninism (San Francisco:. Proletarian
Publishers, 1934), p. 34-36.
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Statement of Problem and Methodology
As early as April, 1982, the Central Committee's minutes reflect that
some members of the committee felt that the party was headed toward a
crisis as a result of weak internal organization and planning. By June
of 1982, it was reported that the party's internal state and links with
the masses were at their worst since the revolution.
The next month Bernard Coard, the chairman of the organizational
committee, central committee and political bureau resigned his posts in
the party but retained his position in the state as Deputy Prime Minister.
Publicly, his reason for resigning was because his presence was holding
back the development of other comrades in the committee. Privately, he
felt that since he was in the forefront of those critical of the party's
work and ideological direction, he did not want to be seen as undermining
Bishop's leadership.
The party met for three days in October 1982 to discuss the Coard
resignation and assess the basis of what some thought was the party's
internal crisis. At this point, the problems were attributed to slackness
in organization and poor control mechanisms in the party; a lack of personal
work plans and low levels of discipline; loose and improper functioning of
the Central Committee and political bureau; and a lack of knowledge and
appreciation of Marxist-Leninist theory by many members.^
The party decided to purge members who were declared unsuitable.
One of the first to go was Kenrick Radix, one of the early founders of
the NJM. Others who were strongly criticised were Fitzroy Bain, General
^Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution
and Invasion (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 106.
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Secretary of the Agricultural Workers Union, and Unison Whiteman, the
country's foreign minister. The October meeting concluded by stating
that the party stood at the crossroads:
The first route would be the petty bourgeois route which
would seek to make Bernard's resignation the issue. This
would only lead to temporary relief, but would lead to the
deterioration of the party into a social democratic party
and hence the degeneration of the revolution. This would
be an easy one to follow given the objectively based back¬
wardness and petty bourgeois nature of the society.
The second route is the communist route - the road to
leninist standards and functioning. The road of democra¬
tic centralism, of selectivity, of criticism and self-
criticism and of collective leadership.^
The party felt that as a result of this meeting they were moving
toward the second route. However, by the Summer of 1983 the problems
persisted, village militias had decreased, rallies had become poorly
attended, mass organizations had become shells of their former selves and
a siege atmosphere had developed in the country which precipitated the
elevation of members of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army to positions of
greater responsibility. In the course of all this the criticism of the
leading bodies increased; by September the criticisms became more precise.
During a special central committee meeting called in September,
Bishop was directly and personally criticised. It was held that the
fundamental problem was the quality of leadership of the CC and the party
provided by Bishop. A proposal was then introduced by Liam James, a
person identified as a Coard supporter, for Joint leadership to be shared
by Bishop and Bernard Coard. The proposal was put to a vote and carried
^U.S., Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada
Documents; An Overview and Selection, Minutes of Central Committee
Meetings, Bubn. 105 (1982), p. 103-105.
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nine in favor, one against and three abstaining.^ Again it was thought
by an obvious majority of the Central Committee that this measure would
address, at least, the internal deficiences of the party. However,
approximately six weeks later Maurice Bishop was dead, the NJM lost power,
and the island was under the occupation of U.S. troops.
The most obvious task an inquiry of this nature would demand would
be a reconstruction and analysis of those last six weeks in order to
determine what could have occurred in that time frame that would result in
such a fundamental reversal of the process in Grenada. However, because
of the profound political, legal and moral implications the Grenada
situation poses for a number of different interests, the task of an
inquiry poses in and of itself problems which go beyond what may have
objectively occurred in Grenada. From the left of the political septrum
to the right, Grenada existed not only as an actuality but as a symbolic
reference point for these various ideological orientations. Consequently,
lost in the morass of competing orthodoxies are the acutal events and
issues which eventually led to the NJM's collapse.
Yet, paradoxically a dominant position in which all sides appear to
agree has emerged. This position asserts that the collapse of the revolution
was the result of a coup within the NJM planned and initiated by a faction
of individuals grouped around Bernard Coard, the deputy prime minister
and former member of the party's politburo and central committee. These
individuals caused Maurice Bishop to be defeated and stripped of his powers




However, for this writer, this strange convergence of opinion provided
sufficient motivation to look into this question more closely. What
became apparent was that this position had not been seriously examined;
it has been accepted uncritically because its supposed truefulness was
self-evident in the fact that Bishop was arrested and eventually killed.
The problem, therefore, for this study was to test this interpretation
against the historical record. In doing so, we found a number of incon¬
sistencies which centered around the three key issues which emerged as
pivotal; the question of the existence or non-existence of a crisis
within the party; joint leadership, and democratic centralism. While the
advocates of the position above agree that these issues identified were
the technical issues which precipitated the collapse, there is a funda¬
mental disagreement on the sequence and relative importance of these
issues with those who do not subscribe to the dominant interpretation.
The individuals who have been the most successful in articulating
the views of the dominant position are Don Rojas, Bishop's former press
®We can only speculate as to the reasons why this interpretation of
the NJM's collapse became the dominant one. First, during the last few
weeks of the crisis inside the party, very little information was allowed
to go beyond the highest organs of the party. Consequently, with the
United States invasion, the incarceration of Coard and his supporters,
and the unprecedented attempt to suppress and distort information coming
out of Grenada for the first few days and months after the invasion, an
information vacuum was created. However, this vacuum was quickly occupied
by the United States Government's attempt to provide justification for
the invasion and the unchallenged explanations of the revolutions's collapse
provided by some Bishop supporters whose critiques and condemnation of
the Coards were only slightly different from those of the U. S. State
Department's. See Don Rojas's "Behind the Revolution Overthrow," Inter-
continental Press, December 26, 1983 and compare with the right wing
analysis of The G'renada Papers, ed. Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall,
(San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984).
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secretary and George Louison a former member of the party's politburo and
Central Committee. Their views of the issues above can be summarized as
follows: First, a crisis did not exist within the NJM until the proposal
for joint leadership between Bernard Coard and Maurice Bishop was
introduced. Joint leadership was in fact part of a game plan by Coard
and his people to seize power. This plan was put into place between
October, 1982 and September, 1983 when Coard consolidated his influence
within the party by advancing members of OREL (Organization of Revolu¬
tionary Education and Liberation) to CC, with three going to the Political
Bureau. The OREL organization grew out of a Marxist-Leninist study group
in which Bernard Coard was the guiding intellectual force. Secondly,
Democratic Centralism was not the real issue as some Coard supporters
would argue but joint leadership. The joint leadership proposal was only
supported by Coard's people and was not ratified by the general membership
of the party.
The Coard supporters say that the crisis in the revolution was taking
place long before the joint leadership proposal was introduced. Moreover,
they claim this proposal was a creative effort to address this crisis, but
Bishop's violation of democratic centralism by refusing to abide by the
decision of the CC and his efforts to subvert the party created the govern¬
mental crisis which ended the revolution.7
Therefore, more precisely, the purpose of this study is to examine
systematically the dominant interpretation of the NJM's collapse, using
^Since most of the individuals identified as part of the Coard fac¬
tion are presently incarcerated in Grenada and unable to present their
views, this position was formulated from comments in the various minutes
of NJM CC meetings.
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as a point of departure the views of Don Rojas and George Louison, the
most credible of Bishop's supporters and spokesmen for this interpreta¬
tion. The focus of this attempt is from early 1982 to October 19, 1983,
the day Bishop was killed. Pertinent questions that will be addressed
are as follows: Was there the perception of a crisis in the party? If
so, what were the issues, events or concepts which led to that perception?
Was the proposal for joint leadership a ploy by the Coard faction to
seize power in the NJM or was it a legitimate attempt to address the
problems the party faced? What person or persons were responsible for
the governmental crisis which led to the collapse of the NJM and the United
States invasion?
In order to address the questions above both primary and secondary
sources will be utilized. However, this study, in order to reconstruct
and analyze the internal events of the NJM, will utilize extensively
primary source materials, mainly the minutes of the NJM's Central Committee
meetings and published interviews with primary actors. In order to insure
the authenticity of the minutes, all quotes were made verbatim. This
means that no grammatical or stylistic changes were made in the text
of the minutes by the writer. In chapter two the question of party
crisis will be addressed. Chapter three will be an examination of the
issue of joint leadership and chapter four will look at the issue of
democratic centralism. In chapter four on the issue of democratic
centralism, it will be necessary to employ a number of different sources
in order to reconstruct the events between October 12 and October 19,




One could assume that the major task of uncovering the reasons for
the failure of the Grenada experience would be taken up by progressive
thinkers concerned with Third World problems, but surprisingly, there is
a disappointing amount of literature which offers a systematic theoretical
analysis of the Grenadian experience from a "radical" perspective. This
lack of critical analysis has created a political vacuum which bourgeois
ideologists have been more than willing to fill. These ideologists appear
to possess a greater appreciation for the historical significance that
the fall of the NJM presents, for their own counter-revolutionary interests,
than most progressive thinkers who presumably are concerned with Third
World tranformation as the following statement demonstrates:
To a degree still not widely appreciated by proponents or
critics alike, the American Invasion of Grenada in October,
1983 was an event of major historical importance. Not only
did the United States action mark the sole occasion, since
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, in which an established
communist regime was deposed by democratic forces, but it
also yielded a treasure trove of captured documents depicting
the inner workings of the New Jewel regime,®
Consequently, Grenada has not only become another example of the
failure of communism, but the collapse of the NJM provides them the
opportunity to gain useful information that can guide them in future
counter-revolutionary activity.
Colin Henfrey, however, in the article, "Between Populism and
Leninism," offers one of the few lucid analyses of the Grenadian experience
from a progressive point of view. He attempts to situate the Grenada
situation within the overall context of marxist theory. For Henfrey,
®Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, eds.. The Grenada Papers (San
Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984), p. 3,
13
this is important because marxism in its encounter with recent history
has a double task: "The formulation of a socialism derivable from Third
World conditions, and a means of survival for its exponents... As Nicaragua
lies under siege and El Salvador struggles into being, with the Grenada
project now destroyed, we should be searching its ashes for new hints
about these tasks.
This is the task Henfrey attempts in this article. He traces the
development of the NJM from the point of its inception to the events
which proved to be its downfall. Methodologically, he felt that in order
to trace this development and pose questions that would result in answers
genuinely applicable to other cases, it is important to apply marxist
concepts and not models to this specific formation. Henfrey's analysis
demonstrates that if questions on the NJM collapse are approached induc¬
tively and openly, instead of recycling generalizations that are
ideologically predetermined, then the radical critiques would have been
fundamentally different than the simplistic Coard-Bishop dichotomization.^^
Henfrey identifies what he considers some of the historical anteced¬
ents to the impeding crisis during what he calls the NJM's second phase
from 1976 to 1979, where there was a decision during this period to shift
formally from a mass to a vanguard party. As a result there was a "demassi-
fication" of resistance which according to Henfrey, had a long term effect
on the party. He characterizes 1979 to 1983 the period of the Peoples'
Revolutionary Government, as between populism and leninism, where the
party progressively withdrew further from the people leaving Bishop's
^Colin Henfrey, "Between Populism and Leninism: The Grenada Experi¬
ence," Latin American Perspectives (Summer 1984): 17.
lOlbid., p. 18.
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personal popularity as the only viable link between the people and the
Government. This was, according to Henfrey, a measure of the movement's
lack of political advance beyond its original populism.^
The implication of Henfrey's analysis is that drop off in mass
participation was actually linked to the party's organizational form
which prevented the party from being fully rooted in the people. Moreover,
his analysis suggests that while the participatory democracy of the local
councils and mass organizations were seen as advances to the democratic
practices of the rest of the Caribbean, questions remain relative to
their autonomy and the accepted range of their activities. He cites a
number of examples which demonstrate that the party was in the process of
becoming highly directive toward these organizations which could account
for the feeling among some of the people in the organizations that they
were not fully entrusted with the ability to make independent decisions
for themselves.
In the book, Grenada; Revolution and Invasion, Anthony Payne, Paul
Sutton and Tony Thorndike expand in detail on some of the analyses advanced
by Henfrey. Their analysis of the internal contradictions identify many
of the relevant theoretical issues referred to in the introduction to
this paper. They devote a chapter to what they call "The Internal Struggle
for Power". In this chapter using primarily the minutes from the NJM's
Central Committee and Political Bureau, they trace the development of the
crisis in the party identifying the dominant issues as the party perceived
lllbid., p. 31
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them. According to these authors, the four-and-a-half years of the revolu¬
tion are characterized as a paradox. They state that while there were
strides made in the economic and social spheres, they were essentially
reformist in character within, at most, a loose social democratic and
idealistic framework. While on the other hand, there was a determination
by the NJM that a party organization was to be constructed on strict,
disciplined marxist-leninist lines with the aim of creating a truly
socialist state and ultimately a communist society. Yet, according to
these authors, the party never conducted what they called a hearts and
minds campaign so that the people could have been more profoundly integrated
into the revolutionary process, "The debates and arguments were conducted
behind securely closed doors by many whose links with the people, their
thoughts and aspirations had become tenuous",^2
These debates eventually led to a struggle for power between what
they called the radicals and the pragmatists. They did not see this
struggle as one involving a personality clash, although personality was a
factor. What was more important and was the hypothesis from which they
operated was that this struggle was for control and direction of the
revolution in a deteriorating social and economic situation. They demon¬
strate how the internal party struggle was intimately bound up with the
practical problems posed by Grenada's small size and limited resource
base, a material problem which in varying degrees confronts many socialist
attempts in the Third World,
However, for a number of individuals (apparently the majority) the
collapse of the revolution does not have to be explained in such high
12payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p, lUt),
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sounding theoretical terms. Since the revolution's collapse, a number of
individuals associated with the so-called Bishop faction have advanced
their own version of the events leading to Bishop's death. Shortly after
the invasion, Don Rojas made a tour of a number of countries explaining
what he thought were the reasons for the revolution's collapse. In a
widely disseminated interview in the Intercontinental Press in December,
1983, Rogas lays the blame squarely on the shoulders of the so-called
Coard faction. Rogas contends that the real crisis began with the proposal
for joint leadership introduced at the September, 1983 Central Committee
meeting.
This proposal represented the attempt to take power by the Coard
faction. He states, "There was absolutely no indication prior to this
meeting that this proposal was in the works, none at all. Certainly the
rank and file party membership did not know about it nor did Maurice
himself."13 Moreover, he asserted that there was no basis, ideological
or organizational, for the joint leadership proposal. He stated categori¬
cally that, "There was no fundamental difference on ideological principles,
no difference whatsoever bn the ultimate objectives of the revolutionary
process between Bernard Coard and Maurice Bishop,"!^ However, he conceded
that "There were probably, some nuances or minor differences on approach
and questions of methodology or tactics and maybe on leadership style."13
The position that the crisis began with the joint leadership proposal
is also reflected in the statements of George Louison, a former member of





the party's leading organs. Referring to the pivotal September, 1983
meeting, he says, "I disputed that there was any crisis. Far from the
people losing confidence in the revolution, they were beginning to settle
down with the revolution and see it as a way of life... when the meeting
began people came up with the discussion on the crisis within the country.
I took the position that there were problems but there was no crisis."^®
Louison laid out three stages of this crisis. The first stage was
the introduction of joint leadership. The second stage was the rushed
vote: "It was wrong to come to a vote at that time because of the fact
that the issue had not been properly debated." The third stage of the
crisis was going to the membership on the issue of democratic centralism
when Bishop said he needed time to think about the proposal
Regarding democratic centralism, Louison dismissed the accusation
that Bishop violated the principles of democratic centralism by not
abiding by the majority decision of the Central Committee. He felt that
the question of joint leadership had not been properly debated. Therefore,
the real issue was not democratic centralism but joint leadership. He
said, "Democratic centralism is the principle by which the party operates.
But in this situation we were dealing with an issue of the most fundamental
character of the revolution — the question of leadership of the process,
and on such a question, a party needed time for a very proper, clear,
thorough, ideologically wel 1 based discussion."!^ Rogas also believes





democratic centralism was not the real issue.
The maneuvers of Coard's Central Committee had nothing
to do with democratic centralism as it was practiced in
Lenin's Bolshevik party or the Cuba Communist party. What
the Coardites labelled iron Leninist discipline was actually
blind mechanical obedience to the dictates of a faction that
had maneuvered behind the backs of the party to replace the
central leadership that had been tested by a decade of strug¬
gle in building the NJM and in leading the workers and farmers
to power.
This conspiratorial interpretation of the events which led to Bishop's
death and the collapse of the NJM, as mentioned earlier, has become the
predominant interpretation of the NJM demise. However, the gaps in the
literature suggest that this position once subjected to a more systematic
inquiry does not hold up under the weight of contrary evidence. Payne,
Sutton and Thorndike reject as simplistic and ahistorical the conspirato¬
rial interpretation. They assert that Bernard Coard had a deeper under¬
standing of the needs of the revolution and his own ability to hold power
than his critics give him credit. They point out, "Throughout the revolu¬
tion, Coard realized the need for public support and mobilization. He
was also aware that he lacked charismatic leadership qualities so admired
by an impressionist and psychologically dependent society...his method of
operating-careful planning and an acute political sixth sense, especially
in meetings - made it easy for those who feared him and his formidable
intelligence to assume cons pi racy."20
l^"0pen Letter from Don Rojas," Intercontinental Press (April 1,
1985): 180.
20payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 143.
CHAPTER II
CRISIS IN THE PARTY
The existence or non-existence of a party crisis is fundamental to
this inquiry in that the perception of a crisis within the party and the
revolution had to have served as the foundation for the introduction of
the joint leadership proposal, otherwise the dominant conspiratorial
thesis is clearly affirmed. For Rojas and Louison, the crisis was in fact
manufactured as a pretext for Bishop's removal. The task in this chapter
is to determine if the evidence supports that contention. The questions
addressed in this chapter are the most elementary questions that any
cursory examination of the NJM's collapse should have addressed long ago.
For example, was there the perception of a crisis in the party? If so,
what were the issues, events or concepts which led to that perception? As
elementary as these questions are, they were not addressed because the
initial interpretations of the NJM's collapse emanated principally from
two sources — agencies of the United States Government and Bishop sup¬
porters — both of which reflected the conspiratorial thesis. Even when
more information began to emerge, in particular, the minutes of the NJM
CC meetings, the analysis of this evidence was biased by a conceptual
framework which flowed essentially from this same perspective. This bias
will be avoided in this chapter.
The data utilized will be primarily minutes from the party's CC
meetings. Using this information, the internal party dynamics will be
19
20
reconstructed In order to address the issue of crisis and determine how
this issue impacted on subsequent developments in the party. However, in
order to properly conceptualize the internal dynamics of the party and
the fine points of contention between party problems and party crisis, a
brief historical overview of the NJM's development is necessary.
Rise of the NJM
The NJM began as a broad based multi-class movement whose primary
goal was the removal of the dictatorial leadership of Eric Gairy, Gai ry
like many other Caribbean leaders began his political career as a trade
unionist in the early 1950's. He built the Grenada Manual and Mental
Workers Union which served as his base for the later Grenada United Labor
Party. Gairy became the dominant personality in Grenada politics up
until the early 1970's when the emergence of two organizations -- The
Joint Effort for Welfare Education and Liberation (JEWEL), led by Unison
Whiteman and the Movement of the Assemblies of the People (MAP), with
Maurice Bishop as its head, gave what had been an organized character a
spontaneous resistance to the growing excesses of the Gairy regime.!
In March of 1973 those two groups came together and became known as
the New Jewel Movement (NJM).^ The party's manifesto reflected a radical
democratic programme whose principal themes were genuine independence,
self-reliance, anti-Gairyism and anti-imperialism. Economically, the
IPor a more indepth analysis of th particular social and economic
factors which led to the rise of Eric Gairy see A. W. Singham, The Hero
and the Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
^Richard Jacobs and Ian Jacobs, Grenada; The Route to Revolution
(Habana, Cuba: Casa de Las American, 1980), p. 77,
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document advocated the complete nationalization of all foreign owned
hotels as well as foreign owned housing settlements, the nationalization
of banks and insurance companies, and proposed a national importing board
to be responsible for importing all goods into the island,^
Grenada in 1973 was still a British dependency; but having achieved
the constitutional status of associated statehood since 1967 meant that
the nation had acquired increased powers of self-rule. The 1967 elections
were held under this new constitutional arrangement and resulted in the
election of Eric Gairy's Greater United Labor Party. The British who
were forced to step in and end the previous rule of Gairy's GULP in 1961
for corrupt practices did not trust Gairy. However, by 1973 with the
increased demands for independence and the emergence of the NJM, they
felt that political developments on the island might take a more dangerous
turn and decided to grant independence to Grenada with the reins of govern¬
ment firmly in Gairy's hands. The HJM responded by mobilizing thousands
of people to protest, but the government responded by arresting six NJM
leaders in November of 1973. This triggered a wave of strikes and demon¬
strations that gathered increased momentum with the main demand being
Gairy's immediate resignation. The strikes effectively shut off the
tourist trade, closed down St. George's harbor for over three months, which
which interrupted agricultural and custom revenues for the entire first
quarter of 1974.
^Fitzroy Ambursley, Grenada; The New Jewel Revolution, ed. Fitzroy
Ambursley and Robin Cohen, Crisis in the Caribbean (New York; Monthly
Review Press, 1983), p. 200.
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Yet, even with all the obvious popular opposition, Grenada was
proclaimed an independent nation within the British commonwealth on Febru¬
ary 7, 1974, with Eric Gairy as Prime Minister, The NJM embarked on an
intensive political education program hoping to take advantage of the
opposition to Gairy's rule. However, by 1976 the organization was still
small and was composed mainly of radicalized elements of the petty
bourgeois. Ideologically, the organization had not developed a clear
ideological position beyond its concerns for basic material needs.
Gairy who saw the NJM as his most fundamental threat aligned himself with
Chile's General Pinochet and grew even more repressive. Two decisions
were made that year which were of fundamental importance. First, the NJM
and the two anti-Gairy bourgeois parties, the Grenada National Party
(GNP) and the United Peoples Party (UPP), entered into a political bloc --
the Peoples Alliance — to contest the 1976 elections. Second, a decision
was made to develop a party structured on Leninist principles of party
organization. These two decisions were important because they reflected
the beginnings of two distinct but not necessarily contradictory strategic
positions developing inside the party.
The decision to contest the elections was made to broaden the base
of the organization by winning over students, more workers and what they
called the middle segments. The NJM formed the largest component of the
alliance and captured three of the seats won by the alliance.^ According
to the NJM this strategy was successful in "Winning over the middle strata
^W. Richard Jacobs, The Grenada Revolution at Work, (pamphlet),
p. 5.
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to the objectives of the NJM, which now came to be viewed as the authentic
opposition to Gairy."^ The decision to develop a more formalized marxist-
leninist Party developed as a result of the intensification of repression
inside the country by the Gairy regime, and the surveillance and harassment
of NJM members abroad. It was felt that even though the party could par¬
ticipate along legal lines, the NJM must be committed to demonstrating
the futility of the parliamentary and legal struggles to overthrow the
Gairy regime. Some have attributed the change in the party's organiza¬
tional emphasis more to the arrival back to the island of Bernard Coard
than the actual objective conditions. However, this postion dimisses the
changed objective conditions of 1976 and implies that there were not
already strong socialist elements inside the organization.
Prior to the decision by the Party to orient itself along marxist-
leninist lines, the NJM was organizationally loose, prossessing much of
the atmosphere of a discussion group and tending to create institutions
only in response to, or after, events.6 From the limited information
reguarding the specifics of the decision making process within the NJM
before 1976, it appears that major policy decisions were made on the
basis of concensus.7 The lack of a strategic program and internal or¬
ganizational coherence was not necessarily detrimental to the NJM in its
early years. By 1976, however, with its electorial activity and the
increased repression by the Gairy regime, the party found itself in an
objective situation which it felt demanded a different organizational
^Ibid., p. 6.
^Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 122.
^Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution, p. 81.
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response. The response required according to the NJM was to develop a
more formalized Marxist-Leninist Party based on the strictest principles
of democratic centralism.® A clandestine wing of the party was also
established made up of elements which became the nucleus of the Peoples'
Revolutionary Army (PRA).^
Structurally, the move to a vanguard party consisted in the party
establishing a nine member Political Bureau which was responsible for the
everyday workings of the party and met on a weekly basis. However, unlike
most Marxist-Leninist parties, there was for a long time no central commit
tee to oversee the work of the political bureau and the party as a whole.
Instead, the bureau was responsible to what they called a Council of
Delegates which met monthly and was made up of representatives from the
party's village and town groups as well as party cells. Both the bureau
and the council were responsible to the party's annual Congress which was
made up of all the party's membership.10
While this organizational structure effectively covered all of
Grenada's villages and towns, it must be remembered that the party
was still small even by Grenada's standards. The mass participation by
the people was reflected by the membership of the mass organizations such





llShortly after the NOM seized power, the NWO claimed a membership
of 7000 in 170 branches and the NYO claimed 9,000 members in 100 branches.
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At this juncture of the Grenadian Revolution, it should be noted
that "neither the internal state of the NJM itself nor political condi¬
tions in general, permitted more than an initial and uncertain step
towards the adoption of demonstrably Marxist positions.However, the
objective and subjective constraints on the NJM did not prevent it from
taking advantage of the historical possibilities that did exist. The
party through its electorial activity, its newspaper — the New Jewel,
rallies and public meetings attempted to expose all of the backward
features of the political system and "develop in the people a determina¬
tion to resist the violent oppression that went along with this program
of exposing and challenging the tyranny,"13 jhe organizational and educa¬
tional activity of the NJM, and the brutal behavior of the Gairy regime
explains, why by 1979, there was such a wide social spectrum of approval
when the NJM took power.
The Context of the Analysis
At every critical juncture in the development of a revolutionary
movement, the form and content of the struggle the organization leading
the movement employs must be grounded in a correct assessment of what is
historically possible. Experience has shown that a revolutionary movement
can fail if an incorrect analysis of objective possibilities is made
which results in the movement attempting to go beyond or lagging behind
what is objectively possible.
l^Fitzroy Ambursley, Grenada; Whose Freedom? (Great Britain: Latin
American Bureau), p. 28.
13w. Richard Jacobs, The Grenada Revolution at Work, (pamphlet),
p. 7.
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The significance of this observation is demonstrated by the practice
of the NJM up to 1979. The NJM determined in 1972 that the exigencies of
the Grenada Revolution required that the party move toward a more Marxist-
Leninist structure. However, an assessment by the party of the objective
and subjective conditions of the country suggested politically, ideologi¬
cally and organizationally the movement towards Marxism-Leninism had to be
cautious. The objective conditions that the party saw were Grenada's
miniscule size, largely peasant character, critical dependence upon the
exports of a few agricultural commodities, and heavy reliance on imports
from and close ties with the economies of the West. The subjective con¬
ditions were the extent to which the people had been indoctrinated and
had accepted institutions and political practices designed by the British.
The correctness of this approach appears to be self evident in the fact
that the party was able to seize power and established the Peoples'
Revolutionary Government (PRG), Yet, the political ascendancy of the NJM
brought with it qualitatively different contradictions. The main contra¬
diction that came to color and characterize the debate in the party
shortly after it seized power until its demise can be characterised as
follows: As a result of the NJM's seizure of power, on the one hand,
there was the necessity to pursue even more vigorously its revolutionary
work and to carry out larger and more complex organizationally tasks, and
on the other hand its persistent organizational inability to meet the
challenges of the new situation.
What was not immediately apprehended by the leadership of the party
was that structurally the seeds of contradiction were put into place
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during the party's earlier period. At the time of the NJM's seizure of
power it was estimated that they were only 45 full members.However,
with that small number, the real power and decision making ability was
with the nine member Political Bureau made up of Maurice Bishop, Bernard
Coard, Fitzroy Bain, Hudson Austin, Selwyn Strachan, George Louison,
Vincent Noel, Kenrick Radix and Norris Bain. When these same individuals
were tasked with the responsibilities of Central Committee membership and
full ministerial duties under the Peoples' Revolutionary Government, the
problems of the absence of a secondary line of leadership began to manifest
themselves.
Therefore by early 1982, the context for the examination of the ques¬
tion of a crisis begins with the party attempting to look within itself
to find the solutions to the problems which were emerging within the
revolution itself. The call for Leninism as a solution to the problems
and the organizational immaturity of the NJM provide the backdrop for the
events and perceptions which develop. The purpose of this chapter is not
necessarily to address theoretical ly the basis of the crisis, but to
determine if in fact the perception of a crisis existing within the party
was a reality prior to the introduction of the joint leadership proposal.
The Essential Question
Rojas states that "The root of the crisis that overcame the party
and the revolution can be traced as far back as July, 1982. At that
l^Henfrey, "Between Populism and Leninism: The Grenada Experience,"
p. 23.
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point Bernard Coard resigned from the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the New Jewel Movement,"15 what does the record show?
Party minutes reflect that the perception among party members that serious
problems existed within the party that could lead to a crisis was evident
as far back as April, 1981. By September of that same year, it was noted
that the work of the CC and party was suffering because many members were
being overworked. It was resolved that CC members would develop personal
work plans and that the CC would meet monthly and draft rest schedules
for members to help alleviate the overwork problem. However, in December
dismay was expressed at the lack of implementation of the CC's resolutions.
In April of 1982, the Central Committee was addressed by Ewart Layne who
raised a number of issues concerning internal party organization and
planning. They were: a) discipline within the party, b) study within
the party, c) the level of present standards of the party, d) work per¬
formance of party cadres, e) the growing trend of arrogance of party
cadres, f) planning in the party, g) guidance given to party applicants,
h) specifically the work performance of leading cadres including CC and
PB (Political Bureau), and i) the flow of information from the top to the
bottom of the party.15
According to Layne, there was a total breakdown in planning by com¬
mittees and organizations which affected party cadres generally. Ian
Bartholomon supported Layne*s assessment, and was the first to use the
term 'crisis' to describe the problems the party faced.
l^Don Rojas, "Behind the Revolution's Overthrow," Intercontinental
Press (December 1983): 757.
15u,S. Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada Docu¬
ments, p. 102-5.
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He is reported as saying "people are not turning up to meetings. Our
level of organization is poor. We are in a 'crisis' and we need to do
something about it.''^^ Bernard Coard agreed that the party faced a crisis
of organization. In his opinion, this stemmed from the party taking
on too many tasks. Comments by Bishop as reflected in the minutes did not
indicate if he thought that the term crisis best described the situation
the party faced, but he did agree that there were weaknesses in the
party's method of work because of it taking on too many responsibilities.
By June of 1982, the perceptions on the CC were that the conditions
in the country had further deteriorated. During this meeting it was said
that the party's internal state and links with the masses were at their
worse since the revolution. The activities of the party, in particular six
national rallies held in the last 14 weeks since the last CC meeting, were
characterized as "aimless, purposeless, and without direct objectives."^^
The leading bodies were criticised for devoting too little time to party
work and too much toward state concerns. As a result of this imbalance,
it was noted that there was little time for internal party building,
expanding party structures, and building party links among the masses.
Between June and October, the problems of the revolution became more
pronounced, the church began to openly criticize the government's intern¬
ment of people without charges. There was mounting opposition to the
NJM's land reform policies, and there was a dramatic drop off of




events took a more surprising turn when Bernard Coard announced his resig¬
nation from both the Central Committee and Political Bureau in October,
1982. Bishop convened an extraordinary meeting for October 12-15 to con¬
sider the Coard resignation.
For the purpose of our inquiry, the October meeting is significant
for a number of reasons. First, this was the point that Coard, according
to Rojas and Louison, put into motion his scheme to take over the party.
Secondly, the minutes reflect clearly that the leadership of the party
perceived the party to be facing a crisis and felt that identification of
the root causes of the crisis was imperative. Finally, in the course of
identifying what the party identified as the basis of the crisis serious
questions were raised about the effectiveness of the leading bodies.
Regarding the first point, Rojas asserts that between October, 1982
and September, 1983, Coard consolidated his influence within the party by
advancing members of OREL to the CC with three going to the Political
Bureau. He implies also that the resignation of Bernard Coard could have
been contrived. The motivation being that Coard did not want to be
personally on the scene while his people positioned themselves for the
eventual grab for power.
In terms of a crisis, the evidence shows that there was unanimity
on that issue. The minutes clearly show that the CC identified three
basis of the crisis, the material, political/ideological and the organiza¬
tional. For our purposes, the latter two are the most significant.
The Political and Ideological Basis - As seen in the failure
of the CC to study for close to one year which has weakened
the extent to which the ideology of Marxism-Leninism acts as
a guide to the actions of the members of the higher'organs.
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This failure to study is definitely linked to the non-
leninist manner of functioning, slackness, timidity and
"ducking" from making principled criticisms.
The Organizational Basis - Seen in the poor functioning of
many party structures, the non-leninist practices of comrades
of higher organs, the inadequate functioning of other party
members in work committees, the lack of reporting, and the
objectively inability of the 0. C. to deal with all matters
of discipline further feeds and allows petty bourgeois ten¬
dencies to dominate the life of the higher organs of the
party.19
Therefore, by October, 1982, not only did the party perceive itself
to be in a crisis, it saw the leading bodies of the party as most respon¬
sible for the crisis.
Summation
For Rojas and the proponents of the conspiratorial theory, the intro¬
duction of joint leadership created the crisis inside the NJM. However,
the evidence presented in this chapter clearly refutes that contention.
Without dwelling at this point on the merits of the crisis, it is clear
that events inside the country and the party had created at least the
perception that a crisis existed. Even if there was a question about the
severity of the crisis when the word was first used in April, 1982, it
is evident that by October most members of the central committee felt
that a crisis had developed which required immediate corrective action.
The Party acknowledged in October, 1982 that it faced serious problems.
The question is why? The answer must be that the resignation of Coard
was the catalyst that compelled the central committee to seriously address
the recurrent problems that many central committee members felt were leading
19ibid
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to the degeneration of the party. Yet, Rojas implies that the resignation
by Coard was the beginning of a plan to take power from Bishop.20 To
support this position, he points out that the Political Bureau was expanded
with the addition of three of Coard's people during the October meeting.
The strategic implication being, of course, that Coard would find it more
advantageous to be outside the party structure while his people manipulated
the party from within.
Item number 14 of the October meeting does reflect that Chalkie
Ventour, Ewart Layne and Owuse James, all later identified as so-called
Coard supporters, were all made members of the Political Bureau. However,
this charge concerning the strategic implications of Coard's resignation
as articulated by Rogas is deceptive for the following reasons: The
implication that the addition of Ventour, Layne and James represented an
expansion of Coard's material base in the leading organs of the party
does not stand up under closer analysis. The main reason being that
Ventour, Layne and James were already members of the CC, the governing
body of the NJM. As in most Marxist-Leninist parties, the Central Commit¬
tee of the NJM did most of its work through its various sub-committees.
The principal sub-committees of the NJM were the Political Bureau, which
was responsible for policy, and the organizing committee which was respon¬
sible for the everyday workings of the party.
However, one of the weaknesses of the NJM's Political Bureau was
that its policy concerns were disporportionately weighted toward the
20"Interview with Don Rojas," Intercontinental Press (December 26,
1983): 757.
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state sector. Very few policy recommendations were made by the Political
Bureau that dealt with the fundamental issues that the revolution and the
party faced. Therefore, the implication that the addition of these
individuals represented an expansion of Coard's power base within the
party is neither supported theoretically nor by an analysis of the actual
working of the NJM, Moreover, the CC was not expanded but was reduced by
two with the resignation of Bernard Coard and Kenrick Radix, a so-called
Bishop supporter. Consequently, there does not appear to be any material
basis for the implication that the October meeting was the beginning of a
shift in power within the party.
The charge that Coard's resignation represented the beginning of a
devious conspiracy to take over the party again appears deceptive.
Coard's public reason for resigning was because he was excessively over¬
worked and obliged single-handedly to develop and administer party and
government policy.21 Privately, he felt that since he was in the fore¬
front of those critical of the party's work, he did not want to be seen
to be undermining Bishop's leadership. At the point when Coard resigned
there was no evidence of any open cleavage between a Bishop ora Coard
tendency; even Don Rojas states, "There was no fundamental ideological
difference between Bernard Coard and Maurice Bishop. No fundamental
differences on ideological principals, no difference whatsoever on the
ultimate objectives of the revolutionary process -- that is to create a
socialist state,"22
2lFitzroy Ambursley, Grenada; Whose Freedom? (Great Britain: Latin
American Bureau, 1984), p. 58.
22"interview with Don Rojas," Intercontinental Press (December 26,
1983): 757.
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However, there did exist some differences in organizational abilities
and leadership style. Coard was an intellectual and a theoretician; he
was principally concerned with planning, administration and ideology.
Bishop, on the other hand, was a charismatic figure, and an accomplished
populist politician. For most Grenadians, Bishop symbolized the revolution
and was the link between the party and the masses. Although intelligent
and highly motivated, he was not a theorist or strategist and proved to
be a poor administer.23 Consequently, much of the responsibility for
transforming the NJM from a heterogeneous grouping of young radicals and
nationalists into a disciplined Marxist-Leninist party fell to Bernard
Coard. However, Coard felt that his ability to carry out his responsi¬
bility as chairman of the organizing committee could not be effectively
carried out because of the low level of development among the CC members.
With his responsibilities in the party and his duties as Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Finance, it became apparent to Coard that the
revolution would be placed in an extremely vulnerable position should
something happen to him. Therefore, he felt that in order for cadre
development to take place within the CC it was necessary for him to step
outside of the party structure.
It is conceivable that Coard's resignation signaled the first move
in a deliberate plan to curb Bishop's authority by placing Coard outside
of the policy-making spheres, and therefore, in a good position to re¬
enter when matters went awry. However, as Ambursley further points out,
"It can however, be presented equally convincingly as the move of a
23Ambursley, Grenada: Whose Freedom?, p. 56.
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prescient and tough politician anxious to school his colleagues through
experience."24
As a result of Coard's resignation, the party held four sessions in
October, 1982 totaling 32 hours where the party examined the work of the
higher organs, assessed the performance of each member of the CC and made
a number of decisions that the party felt would lead it forward. Conse¬
quently, it appears that at that juncture of the party's development,
Coard's resignation had more positive potentialities than negative.
In conclusion, the purpose of this chapter was to determine the
existence or non-existence of a party crisis. The data presented
demonstrated that regardless of the merits, the perception that a crisis




The beginning of 1983 saw the party engage in intensive discussion
concerning two problems. First, the deterioration of the economy with
the attendant deterioration of infrastruture, and second, the relationship
of the party to the masses. The party had made a decision in December,
1982 to concentrate on three priority areas, agriculture, industry and
the Center for Popular Education. It was thought that a firm alliance had
to be built between the workers and peasants and both had to be won over
to socialism. However, in March 1983, the CC received a report which
alleged that the party was close to losing its links with the masses and
that this was holding back the party building process. This was compounded
by an invasion threat that same month which compelled the party to put
off its self-assessment until July.l
The meeting between July 13-19 was the first plenary session ever
of the entire NJM. During the 54 hours the party met, a number of concerns
were raised which suggested to the party that its relationship to the
masses was becoming increasingly tenuous. It was reported that public
Ifhe United States backed invasion of Nicaragua by mercenaries based
in Honduras, which began in March 1983, was seen as a prelude to an
imminent attact upon Grenada. Tension was increased further when the
United States President in a speech to the nation on March 23rd
identified Grenada as a threat to the national security. For further
elaboration on the degree of concern that the NJM viewed these acts as a




dissatisfaction had become more obvious. Rallies were still poorly
attended. Two rallies scheduled in St. George, the capital, had to be
called off due to lack of support. On one occasion it was noted that
party cadres were chased down the street in Sauters by irate villagers
who dismissed their propaganda as communist. Moreover, the anti-communist
ideological offensive of the church was gaining ground, with the Center
for Popular Education unable to meet the battle for the minds of the youth
because of bureaucratic and leadership inefficiency. All this was taking
place within an economy that was deteriorating sharply. There was a
serious cash flow problem as a result of funds being diverted to the
airport project, which slowed or halted most capital improvement projects,
causing layoffs and shaking confidence in the revolution. At this point
the leadership question was becoming more specific; the party determined
that the main feature of the present political and economic situation was
"The continued failure of the party to transform itself ideologically and
organizationally and to exercise firm leadership along a leninist path."2
Consequently, the CC made a number of decisions to address these problems.
Every aspect of the economy and all aspects of the party were assessed
and solutions advanced, all with one common focus, the need to restore
the revolutionary momentum and deepen the ideological process.
However, by August, the CC met in an emergency meeting to consider a
report by Leon Cornwall, the ambassador to Cuba. According to Cornwall,
the feedback he received was that some party members felt that the con¬
clusions of the CC were not correct. That some senior party members felt
2u.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada Docu¬
ments, p. 110-1.
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that some CC members were not functioning properly, or were performing
in a weak manner. For Cornwall these statements were given added weight
because he had received similar statements from 'comrades' in the 6DR
and Carlos Diaz and Pinero, both prominent members of Cuba's communist
party, who rated the state of work of the NJM as 'bad'. Selwyn Strachan,
a long time NJM militant, is recorded as saying during this meeting that,
"sections of the party have begun to rebel against the higher organs of
the party. This is a serious and dangerous development. At the heart of
the matter is the CC -- CC's last assessment of itself was opportunist."3
Liam James made the point that they were witnessing the disintegration of
the party. He added, "We need to convene once more a new holistic
assessing by the Central Committee."^ A decision was made to meet in a
special plenary session from September 13 through 15. Making the closing
remarks of this meeting. Bishop told his fellow CC members "We should
reflect on the individual strengths and weakness of all CC members. We
should also think about the specific responsibilities of the CC comrades
both at the party and state level..
Two days before the September meeting, all CC members overseas were
ordered home so that by the 15th all were present except Hudson Austin,
Commander of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army who was enroute from North
Korea and Ian St. Bernard who was ill. At the very start of the meeting
the proposed agenda that Bishop circulated was rejected. Comments by
^Ibid., p. 111-4. During the July Plenary, the CC had made the




Liam James indicated that he felt that the proposed agenda was lacking in
focus and was not consistent with what was agreed upon in the emergency
meeting in August. The proposed agenda by Bishop was as follows:
14 September
1. Minutes
2. Levels of preparation
3. Feedback from members work committees and masses
4. Evaluation of feedback
5. Evaluation of CC (1) collective role/collective work
15 September
5. Evaluation of CC (2) individual assessment
6. Key areas of implementation of CC Conclusions
16 September
6. Key areas of implementation of CC Conclusions
7. (a) Proposed new responsibilities of CC cdes
(b) Proposed responsibilities of CC Secretariat
(c) New decisions of CC
(d) Proposed meeting/dates and agenda of CC
(e) a, b, c, d, e, (10:45 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.)
The main purpose of this meeting according to James was to discuss
the state of the party and revolution and the work of the CC. Consequently,
after some discussion, the agenda as follows was agreed on:
1. Analysis of the party and revolution
2. Analysis of the CC (Main Problem)
3. The way forward^
In the first section of the agenda -- analysis of party and state of
the revolution — the comments indicated a high level of dispondency and
dissatisfaction among the committee members. Liam James leads off the
discussion: "The party is crumbling, all mass organizations are to the
6lbid., pp. 112-1 & 2.
^Ibid., p. 112-3.
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ground, organs of people's democracy are about to collapse. The internal
state of the party is very dread, there is widespread protest against the
higher organs, the CC has proven its inability to give leadership to the
process.Comments by Chalky Venton and Leon Cronwal1 are of a similar
tone. Cronwal1 states, "The CC has failed to develop a perspective on how
the revolution must develop, there is confusion among the party masses."^
Chris Deriggs presents 8 points that he felt characterized the NJM.
They are: 1) inconsistency, 2) insufficient planning, 3) vascillation,
4) agreement in principle windbagism in practice, 5) inadequate vision of
the future, 6) crisis management, 7) poor attitude toward criticism and
8) lack of perspective of the future.The other comments recorded in
the minutes reflected the same level of dissatisfaction.
The characterization of Bishop's response to these comments was that
he was "struck by the levels of thought and preparation of cdes as evi¬
dent in their various contributions."^! He felt that some conclusions
were a bit premature but overall essentially correct. He agreed that
the main problem was located in the CC. In his view, this stemmed from
two factors: 1) Low ideological levels, insufficient knowledge and
awareness and 2) the lack of perspective as evident in a number of CC
meetings e.g., 16th July. However, points are coming out more sharply







what some felt were only vague solutions to the party crisis. The specific
solutions were "1) find methods of improving the work and individual and
collective leadership of the CC; 2) the need to develop a perspective
based on M. L. criteria to guide the work in the coming period; 3) Urgently
find creative ways of opening the links with and our work among the
masses; 4) establish meaningful channels of communications between the
leadership and the leadership and the membership and to formally rational
the work among party comrades bearing in mind the grounds of complaints of
over work and lack of inner party democracy; and 5) the CC needs to devel¬
op structures for accountability bearing in mind that cdes are now
demanding account from the party".13
However, the next day during the session on the collective and
individual analysis of the CC, party members had a different assessment of
the solutions needed to pull the party out of its crisis. For the first
time Bishop was directly and personally criticized. James began the
discussion ... "The most fundamental problem is the quality of leadership
of the Central Committee and the party provided by cde. Maurice Bishop."!^
James went on to say that Bishop's charisma was not enough, what was
needed at this period in the party's development were qualities of leader¬
ship that he felt Bishop lacked. For James those qualities were; "1) a
leninist level of organization and discipline; 2) great depth in ideologi¬





continues, "It is clear that cde Bishop lacks these qualities put forward
by cde James."!® Cornwall adds, "The root cause was that the chairmanship
and leadership of the CC appears weak."!^ Phillis Coard is recorded as
saying, "The cde leader has not taken responsibility, not given the neces¬
sary guidance, even in areas where he is directly in charge...he is disor¬
ganized very often, avoids responsibility for dealing with critical areas
of work e.g., study class.At this point in the meeting, it should be
noted that those individuals, later to be identified as Bishop supporters,
did not appear to be overly concerned about the course of the discussion;
in fact, they appeared to agree with the comments. Unison Whiteman, a
long time friend of Bishop says, "...the weaknesses mentioned of the cde
leader are correct. Since October, there have been improvements in
scheduling and study, but these improvements are not fundamental enough."!^
Louison states, "The points made by James and Cornwall have really crystal-
ized the problem which we have to find ways of solving."20 Bishop
responded to these comments by thanking the members for their frankness.
He criticised the members for not raising those observations earlier.
According to the minutes, "He agreed that the points are correct especi¬








After lunch, the party reconvened to consider the role of the CC.
Bishop proposes that the CC move to meetings once per month and to have
three holistic plenary sessions each year. But Layne interjects that the
real problem is the unscientific approach to work by the CC. He says,
"We need to find the root of the contradiction or we will continue to
face problems."22 Liam James then advances five proposals, one of which
was the joint leadership proposal. According to James, joint leadership
would be "marrying the strengths of cdes Bishop and Coard."23 He then
went on to define the responsibilities of Coard and Bishop under this
arrangement. Bishop would direct work among the masses, focus on produc¬
tion and propaganda, be responsible for the work of the organs of popular
democracy and the mass organizations, militia mobilization and regional
and international work. Coard would be responsible for party organiza¬
tion, ideological development of party members, and party strategy and
tactics.24
With this proposal made, the debate curiously did not center on that
particular issue. Instead, it centered on Deriggs proposal to remove
Austin from his position as Army Chief of Staff and his proposal to send
Louison to St. Andrews Parish, a section of the country where the NJM's
influence was the weakest. However, when Bishop did respond, he expressed
some concern about the operationalization of certain responsibilities of





know what Coard thought about the proposal. He felt that the dis¬
cussion and the joint leadership proposal reflected a vote of no confi¬
dence and wondered how the masses would accept it and the impact it would
have on the party's international image. Responding to the charge of no
confidence, Layne is reported as saying, "The criticisms were made by all
comrades in the spirit of love for the party, ideological clarity and
wanting to build a genuine M.L. party and to build the working class...
It will be sad if the meeting concluded that this was a vote of no confi¬
dence. This was done in the interest of the party and revolution what we
are solving here is a problem that we experience for years."25
George Louison and Unison Whiteman were clear in their opposition to
joint leadership. While both welcomed the idea of Coard returning to the
CC, and agreed with much of the criticisms of Bishop's leadership abilities,
they felt that the CC was shifting too much of the blame for the party's
problems away from the CC collectively on to Bishop. Whiteman made a
counter proposal that Coard should be given specific functions as Deputy
leader.26 The issue of joint leadership was then brought to a vote.
Nine voted in favor of joint leadership, 3 abstained. Bishop, Austin and
Whiteman with Louison voting against.27 it was then agreed not to inform
the masses for the time being. At this point. Bishop opposed a move to
invite Coard to the meeting because he wanted time to reflect on the





since he would be leaving for St. Kitts in the morning. After some
discussion, this was agreed to only after Bishop agreed to meet with
Coard after he had time to reflect on the matter. The meeting then ended
after some intense discussion on the question of the minutes going to the
full membership. Bishop and Louison argued forcefully against the minutes
going to the membership. Layne, James and others who had voted for joint
leadership felt that the minutes should go to the membership.
Summation
Both Rojas and Louison assert that the real catalyst that triggered
the crisis in the party was the proposal for joint leadership. However,
as we have already discovered, the perception that a crisis existed in
the party was prevalent long before this proposal was advanced and
approved. Yet, the introduction of joint leadership does raise some in¬
teresting questions. Some commentators have identified the August meeting
as the point when the Coard faction put into place its plan to take over
the party. Ambursley states that from the minutes the introduction of
joint leadership, "Indicate that many members may have been aware of the
proposal and supported it in a uniform, almost orchestrated fashion,"28
Payne, Sutton and Thorndike repeat the allegation that between the
August meeting and the special plenary session in September, the Coard
faction met privately.29 Although these authors do not provide any addi¬
tional information that could prove or disprove these allegations, for the
28Ambursley, Grenada: Whose Freedom?, p. 60,
29payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 118.
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purposes of this Inquiry, these concerns are important enough to warrant
an investigation.
How do we address them? To begin, we must acknowledge that the
concert of agreement with James' proposal for joint leadership could in¬
dicate that the level of dissatisfaction with Bishop's leadership was
such that the proposal, as articulated by James, seemed to be a logical
alternative to the present leadership structure. But in order to address
these questions more concretely, it is necessary to examine material
which could prove or disprove the question of prior knowledge. Unfor¬
tunately, the kind of data which could provide a definitive answer to
these questions has not been uncovered. Therefore, we must look for
indicators of prior knowledge from sources which seemingly are unrelated
to the concern under question.
One possible indication of prior knowledge is provided for us by
Louison. Louison states that on Tuesday, September 13 before the begin¬
ning of the meeting he had a long discussion with Selwyn Strachan concerning
the complaints about the work of particular individuals on the Central
Committee. Those individuals were Hudson Austin, Unison Whiteman, Fitzroy
Bain, Ian St. Bernard and Kamau McBarnett. At the end of this meeting he
says, "We arrived at the conclusion that there could be no removal nor
additions to the Central Committee."30 Additionally, he says he had the
same discussion with Chris Deriggs. At the end of this conversation,
Louison says, "I think he too was of the position that there could be no
removals or additions to the Central Committee."31




What is significant about the conversations Louison had with Strachan
and Deriggs is that both voted for the joint leadership proposal and that
during those extended conversations, Louison was not able to discern that
a conspiracy had been initiated to take over the party. What is even
more instructive about the conversation he had with Strachan is that like
Louison, Strachan is one of the NJM's original leaders and was a long
time friend of both Louison and Bishop.
There does not seem to be any logical reason why Strachan, Louison's
friend, could not have raised even in broad theoretical terms, the ques¬
tion of Bishop's leadership during that long conversation if he had prior
knowledge that the leadership question was going to be raised. Clearly,
Louison did not know that joint leadership was going to be introduced,
and it appears that neither did Strachan before the fact. But even more
importantly, the conversation Louison had with Strachan and Deriggs
raised two other issues germane to this discussion. First, it indicated
the informal manner in which the NJM members operated. Secondly, it
makes the issue of certain individuals caucasing in private a 'red herring.'
If the purpose of Louison's meeting with Strachan and Deriggs would have
been to discuss the removal of those five individuals from the CC, is it
not conceivable that they could have levelled the charge that certain
individuals had caucased against them?
The fact that these meetings took place and that important party
concerns were discussed outside of formal party structures indicates that
it was a common practice and was nothing out the ordinary for NJM militants.
Therefore, even if it could have been shown that certain individuals had
met between August and September and discussed the leadership problems.
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it is only with conspiratorial hindsight that any significant importance
would have been attached to that meeting.
The vote for joint leadership provides another anomaly for the con¬
spiratorial thesis. Fitzroy Bain, the president of the Agricultural and
General workers union and CC member, was killed along with Bishop during
the events of October 19. Consequently, he has been identified as a so-
called Bishop supporter. Yet, on the crucial issue of joint leadership,
it appears that Bain voted in favor of the proposal. A point that all the
researchers up to this point failed to notice. The reason why they have
failed to notice this crucial fact is because of the conflicting accounts
of the voting results. There were two votes taken relating to joint
leadership. The first vote was on the proposal by Liam James which had
five items, one of which was the joint leadership proposal. This vote
was recorded as nine in favor, two against and two abstaining. This
apparently was the vote Payne, Sutton and Thorndike used. They identify
Louison and Whiteman as having voted against and Bishop and Austin as the
two that abstained.32
The second vote, however, was the one that dealt specifically with
the 'formalization* of joint leadership. This vote was recorded as nine
in favor, one against and three abstaining. Ambursley, using this vote,
states that Louison voted against the proposal, with Bishop, Austin and
Whiteman abstaining.33
32payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada; Revolution and Invasion,
p. 121.
33Ambursley, Grenada: Whose Freedom?, p. 60
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But whatever the distribution of the four votes that opposed or abstained,
it is clear that Fitzroy Bain, a so-called Bishop supporter in the end,
at this point voted for joint leadership. The specific reasons why Bain
ended up with the so-called Bishop people in the end will be address in
later chapters. What is of fundamental importance for this study is that
this fact raises serious doubts about the conspiratorial theory concerning
the nature of the joint leadership proposal. If we accept the charge
that joint leadership was part of a plot to "hyjack" the CC, first
articulated by Rojas and Louison and now the conventional wisdom, we must
then ask what compelled some of Bishop's closest comrades to join in this
plot to overthrow him? Louison states that it was opportunism. However,
the evidence suggests that an analysis which results in that kind of
conclusion can only be arrived at as a result of a certain conspiratorial
bias. Unfortunately, it has been the conspiratorial presuppositions
which have prevented many commentators on this subject from discerning
the obvious contradictions between the assertions by Roja and Louison and
the historical records. For example, Louison states that during the
September meeting only Coard people argued that a crisis existed in the
party. He says, "I took the position that there were problems, but there
was no crisis."34 To support his position that the crisis in the party
was contrived, he adds, "Maurice was also quite firm that there was no
crisis; there were problems but no crisis."35




Yet, the minutes show that at the end of the first day of the meeting
Bishop sums up by saying, "There is a state of deep crisis in the party
and revolution, and the main reason for these weaknesses is the function of
the CC."36
This gross distortion of the historical record may have been why
some felt that in order to avoid confusion, it was necessary that the
minutes of this meeting be distributed to the entire membership. A
proposal Bishop and his supporters opposed, in particularly Louison. This
appears contradictory since Louison states that he felt that this proposal
needed a "...clear, thorough, ideologically well based discussion." The
discussion which was scheduled to take place with the entire membership
on the 25th of September promised to be even more thorough if the members
had all the information they needed. Yet, Louison felt that if everyone saw
what each person was saying in the meeting that could create the basis
for undermining the CC.
In conclusion, the evidence at this point does not support the
assertion that the joint leadership proposal was an attempt by a group of
people organized around Bernard Coard to take over the Central Committee
of the NJM. It appears that fundamentally this issue was introduced,
debated and then democratically voted on. Even if we assume that 1) there
was an identifiable Coard faction and that, 2) this faction had pre-formu-
lated the proposal for joint leadership, the very fact that some of Bishop's
closest political allies either abstained or voted in favor of the proposal
36u.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada Docu¬
ments, p. 112-13.
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suggests that it had some meritorious value within that context. However,
the duplicity on the part of the surviving members of what we conveniently
call the Bishop supporters calls into question their credibility and
their roles in the subsequent collapse of the NJM, It appears that even
though most agreed with the assessment of Bishop's organizational skills,
the Bishop supporters were unwilling to see any fundamental alteration of
party leadership. This raises another interesting point, the question of
who becomes a Bishop or Coard supporter. The designation of Bishop or
Coard supporter, from all accounts is based on two factors: first, where
one voted on the joint leadership proposal and what side one stood on
October 19. As we have seen, this is problematic because the shifting of
key people from one camp to another appeared to be based more on where
they stood on certain issues than their loyalty to a personality. The
sharpening of differences between what became the majority of the NJM and
the minority becomes even more clear in the next chapter where the crucial




There is a direct correlation between the sequence of events and the
emergence of the critical issues. This fact is readily apparent with the
emergence of democratic centralism as a critical issue after the introduc¬
tion of joint leadership. The significance of this issue is that the
point of contention on this issue more sharply delineates the differences
between the so-called Coard and Bishop supporters. The so-called Coard
supporters justify their behavior during the critical period between
September 17 and October 19 as their attempt to uphold the integrity of
democratic centralism. The so-called Bishop supporters reject this claim.
They assert that democratic centralism was only used as a device to
obscure the fact that the real issue was joint leadership. As Louison
put it, "Democratic Centralism is the principle by which the party
operates. But in this situation we were dealing with an issue of the
most fundamental character for the revolution — the question of leadership
of the process."^ Rojas argues that on joint leadership. Bishop was
willing to abide by the principles of democratic centralism.




Bishop's position on this, according to Rojas, was that "He did not have
a problem with the proposal in principle -- that if it was a majority
decision of the party, he would abide by the principle of democratic
centralism."2 The ambiguous and somewhat conflicting interpretations of
the pro-Bishop supporters on the issue of democratic centralism illustrates
the importance of this issue to our inquiry.
If both the so-called Bishop and Coard supporters make the claim
that they were willing to/or operating within the principles of democratic
centralism, the following implications then arise: 1) Events occurred
which were so fundamentally abnormal that the normal dictates of party
discipline had to be discarded (the implications of Louison's statement).
2) Bishop was willing to abide by the decision of the majority and
implement joint leadership, but this issue did not represent a majority
decision by the party and was indeed part of a plot to take over the
party by the Coards. Therefore, Bishop was not bound by the dictates of
democratic centralism (the implication of Rojas statement which converges
with Louison's position). 3) Joint leadership represented the wishes of
the majority in the party, and that for whatever reasons. Bishop and his
supporters self-consciously violated the norms of party discipline (demo¬
cratic centralism) putting into motion events which led to a governmental
crisis for the NJM. Therefore, an examination of this issue and the
events which occurred between September 17 and October 19 is of crucial
importance for this inquiry. In order to provide the theoretical frame¬
work for our inquiry in this chapter, the researcher will briefly discuss
^"Interview with Don Rojas," Intercontinental Press (December 26,
1983): 757.
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the concept of democratic centralism. Next, the researcher will systema¬
tically delineate the events as they occurred during this period as seen
from the conspiratorial perspective. Presented next will be the version
of the events which occurred during that period as revealed by our findings.
The chapter enda with a summation of the findings and analysis.
Democratic Centralism
In order to provide the theoretical framework for our examination of
democratic centralism, it is necessary that we briefly describe the charac¬
teristics of a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party, and the basic ideas of
democratic centralism.
The concept of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard grew out of the
exigencies of the communist movement in the late 19th century.^ Lenin is
attributed by many as the one most influential in developing for Marxism
practical organizational principles for carrying out the socialist revolu¬
tion. The Marxist-Leninist party is principally an instrument for collec¬
tive action in the interest of the working class. In practice a working
class party consists of persons who recognize that in the modern world
it is the working class that is the agent most capable of bringing about
the revolutionary transformation of a capitalist society into a socialist
society. In order for that transformation to take place, an instrument
is required that can galvanize the most advances elements of the working
class into an effective fighting force that can seize power and guide the
3 Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of
Policies (London: Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 56-57.
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society through the transition to socialism. Some of the core organizational
principles of Leninism included: 1) the recruitment of only the most
energetic, hard working respected and militant people into the revolutionary
organization; 2) a high level of commitment to the party by party members
and an enthusiastic willingness to carry out party policy; 3) the highest
degree of knowledge about the social conditions in which the party
is working and the situation at all levels of the party itself; 4) the
highest degree of coordination of the activities of the members of the
organization; 5) full democracy within the party; 6) the highest degree
of flexibility in the choice of specific strategies and tactics; 7) the
proper mix of secrecy and openness; and 8) an appreciation for the role
of leadership.
A fundamental characteristic of party organization based on the
Leninist model is democratic centralism. The democratic aspect of this
concept means that at all levels of the party, decisions should be taken
only after full discussion with all members being afforded equal status
in discussions. However, once a decision is reached, all are bound by
the majority decision. The centralism of the concept implies that the
lower organs of the party are bound by decisions arrived at by the higher
organ.
At the 1920 meeting of the Communist International, a definition of
democratic centralism that was thought to be definitive was developed.
^Albert Szymanske, “Exchange on Revolution and Democracy," Socialist
Revolution (October 1974): 110.
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It states:
The communist party must be built on the basis of democratic
centralism. The basic principles of democratic centralism are
that the higher party bodies shall be elected by the lower,
that all instructions of higher bodies are categorically and
necessarily binding on the lower, and that there shall be a
strong party centre, whose authority is universally and un-
questioningly recognized for all leading party comrades in the
period between congresses.^
The consistency, development and unity of thought on the concept of
democratic centralism is reflected in the statements of Mao Zedong who
says some years later, "We must affirm anew the discipline of the party,
namely:
1. the individual is subordiante to the organization,
2. the minority is subordinate to the majority,
3. the lower level is subordinate to the higher level, and
4. the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.
Whoever violated these articles of discipline disrupts party unity.
The highest organ of the Marxist-Leninist party is a meeting which repre¬
sents the entire membership. This meeting usually takes place in the
form of a party congress. In between sessions of party congresses the
governing body of the party is its central committee. The role of the
central committee in a Marxist-Leninist party is pivotal, as indicated
bel ow.
The role of the CC in the life of the party and country
is very great and many-sided. The CC is the militant
headquarters of the party. Its ideological, political
and organizational center. There is not a single question
^George H. Sabine and Thomas L. Thorson, A History of Political
Theory, 4th ed. (Illinois: Dryden Press, 1973), p. 134.
^Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. II (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1967), p, 203-204.
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of any significance to the country which can be decided
without the CC, without its guidance.^
The Centra! Committee does much of its work through its sub-committees.
The principle sub-committees of the NJM were the Political Bureau and the
Organizing Committee.
In summary, democratic centralism combines the extensive development
of inner-party democracy with strict party discipline. Within this unity
of democracy and centralism, the minority is subordinate to the majority,
the lower level subordinate to the higher and the entire membership to
the central committee. This is the framework that will be utilized to
examine the issue of democratic centralism and the events which occurred
during the last four weeks of the NJM's existence. It is not the purpose
of this inquiry to criticize the merits of democratic centralism. It is
only noted that this was the objective standard that all party members
were required to submit to. Therefore, this inquiry will proceed within
the context of these objective standards.
Chronology of Events Betweeen September 17 and October 19
The basis of the conspiratorial perspective is based on a particular
conception of the events in Grenada. The following is a chronology of
the significant events during the 4 weeks of the crisis as seen from the
conspiratorial perspective.
17 September Bishop and Unison Whiteman leave for independence
celebrations in St. Kitts. The CC meets in his
absence and Strachan outlines the decisions of
the CC to Bernard Coard.
^I. Pranin and M. Stepichen, Leninist Standards of Party Life,
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 50.
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25 September Meeting of full membership. Both Rojas and Louison
are conspicuously silent on the details of this
meeting. However, Louison states that it was after
this meeting that Coard moved to consolidate his
position.8
26 September Bishop and an entourage which included Whiteman leave
on a trip to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Bishop's




According to Rojas and Louison, this was the period
the conspiracy became even more apparent. The Coard
group placed themselves in virtual control of the
party and the military, preparing to remove Bishop
from leadership.^
6-8 October Bishop makes unschedule stop in Cuba for 36 hours on
his way back from Eastern Europe.
8 October Bishop returns to Grenada but contrary to precedent,
only Minister of National Mobilization, Selwyn Strachan
comes to meet him. This, according to Rojas and Louison,
demonstrated Bishop's "marginalization" in the party.
8-12 October Between Saturday, October 8, and Wednesday, October 12,
Bernard Coard lined up the conditions for house arrest
of Maurice Bishop and for the events to come.
13 October Bishop is placed under house arrest for allegedly
spreading a rumor that the Coards v/ere planning to have
him killed. Louison is also expelled from the CC and
PB for violations of democratic centralism. A meeting
of the entire party is called where the decisions of
the CC are explained.
15-18 October After a number of events which demonstrated the
people's disapproval of Bishop's arrest, Strachan
and Coard representing the "Coard faction" enter
into negotiations with Louison on behalf of Bishop.




19 October The "masses" liberate Bishop from house arrest
and march to Fort Rupert where they occupy the
fort. The Coard group then orders the PRA to
storm the fort. Three armoured cars approach
the fort and open fire with automatic weapons.
Dozens of Bishop supporters are slaughtered by
the PRA, Bishop and his closest supporters are
taken alive and then summarily executed.
Democratic Centralism or Party Coup?
To briefly recapitulate, the September 16th meeting ended after an
acrimonious debate on the relative merits of the minutes being distributed
to general membership. Joint leadership had been approved; it was decided
to meet the next day with Bernard Coard attending the CC meeting for the
first time since 1982.
The next day, Saturday, September 17, the CC met with Bernard Coard
present. Selwyn Strachen detailed the position of the CC to Coard and
outlined the duties of joint leadership, Coard is recorded as responding
by raising four points.
1. He would like to see the minutes of the meeting.
2. The positions of those who opposed or abstained and
what were the reasons.
3. Were other options examined, what were these options
and why were they rejected?
4. Why was not this meeting scheduled so that cde Bishop
could be present,
loThe chronology, in particular for the events on October 19, were
compiled froma number of sources. See: Seabury and McDougall, pp. 10-11;
George Sanford, Grenada; The Untold Story, pp. 161-164; and Communist
Affairs, Latin America and the Caribbean, vol, 3, pp, 290-293. The use
of these sources as representative of the conspiratoral view for the
events of October 19 was necessary because, again, Louison and Rojas are
conspicuously silent on the specific events of that day,
llu.S, Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada Docu¬
ments, p. 112-39,
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These points were addressed by various members who related to Coard
the essential points of the previous day's meeting. Deriggs defended
Bishop's request for time to reflect on the issues because it represented
a moral crisis for him. Coard agreed to accept joint leadership, but he
felt that the practicalities of the concept must satisfy Bishop and a
time frame established for informing the masses. The meeting ended with
the CC agreeing to meet with the entire membership on September 25. In
the interim Layne suggested that the CC meet from Monday to Friday to
work out the package of measures the party needed to save itself.
Bishop returned from St. Kitts late on September 22. He was asked
to attend the plenary meeting scheduled for the next day, but he declined
because he said he was tired and still needed to reflect. The meeting of
the entire membership took place as scheduled on the 25th. However,
Bishop again refused to attend because he needed more time to reflect.
Upon hearing that Bishop would not attend, Coard felt it inappropriate
for him to attend since "this may inhibit free and frank discussion."12
Coard pointed out, however, that if the general membership requested his
presence, he was willing to comply. Liam James, who was the chair, opened
up the floor for discussion. The minutes reflect that an overwhelming
majority of the members felt that both Bishop and Coard should be present.
Layne asked the membership rhetorically, "Will we build a Marxist-Leninist
party as voted for by the general membership in 1982 when the line of
march was presented? Will we institute democratic centralism for all?
Will the minority submit to the majority? Will there be one discipline
12ibid., p. 113-8.
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binding on all or will it be for everyone except the leader?"13
It was also pointed out to the membership that Bishop was given a
week to reflect on this issue and that he was to give his input to the CC
on the 23rd, but that he declined to come to the meeting. Unison Whiteman,
on a point of order informed the members that Bishop tried to attend a CC
meeting on Saturday the 24th, but it was cancelled, James responded by
explaining that the meeting was cancelled because the documentation for
it was not complete. A vote was then called for to ask for Bishop's
presence. Forty-six voted for his presence with one against and one
abstaining,!^ A delegation was then formed to convey to Bishop the
decision of the general membership. Coard was also contacted and arrived
quickly.
Bishop, however, sent a note back with the delegation saying he still
wanted time to formulate his position, but said he had always accepted
the concept of joint leadership since 1973 when he and Whiteman were
joint co-ordinating secretaries of the newly formed NJM.IS Bishop even¬
tually arrived to the meeting, and was then asked to explain his absence.
According to the minutes, his reply follows:
Cde. Bishop in response said that he assumed that the CC
would explain his position to the GM. He added that the
discussions in the CC plenary has raised concerns to him.
When stripped bare and until he has completed his reflec¬
tion then he can face the GM with a clean conscience. He
is now relatively confused and emotional. There are







Bishop also expressed concern about how the masses would see joint
leadership. There was a possibility that the masses might see joint
leadership as the result of a power struggle.
...The masses have their own conception and perception
that may not be necessarily like ours who study the
science. Our history shows that the masses build up a
personality cult around a single individual
He accepted some of the criticism of his leadership, but intimated that
within the context of his experiences in Grenada, his style was a natural
reaction to the abuses of one man leadership. However, he acknowledges
that within the new context this approach may have been in error.
He admitted that his style of leadership has led to
vacillation, indecisiveness in many cases. He confessed
that maybe his conception of leadership is idealistic
because of the historical abuse of power and one man
leadership. He and his contemporaries have distaste for
one-man leadership and that his style of leadership is
in error since it calls for consensus, unity at all cost
and this causes vacillation. And his is not sure that he
has overcome this.l^
On the question of his continued leadership role in the party and the
joint leadership proposal, the report continues:
He then said that he is concerned about what is the real
meaning of the CC's position. He is having horrors. If
it is what he is thinking of then he does not see himself
as being on the CC or the CC as a leader. He said that




agitate the masses, to articulate the position of the
party and government to the masses, and to hold high the
banner of the revolution in the region and internationally,
and his weaknesses were lack of Leninist level organization
and discipline, brillance in strategy and tactics, and all
that have been said. But the CC said that precisely those
qualities he lacks are those required to carry the revolu¬
tion forward because those he has can't take it further.
Thus, the strengths of two comrades are to be married
together. He is suspicious that comrades have concluded
that the party must be transformed into a Marxist-Leninist
party and thus he is the wrong person for the leader.
He can't accept this compromise; it is unprincipled. He
explained that for him to put out his strenghts it must be
as a result of a deep conviction, love for the poor and
working people, and out of a feeling of confidence from
the CC.ly
Bishop ended his address by asking the comrades their preference. He
alluded to certain forces that saw his continued presence on the CC only
in tactical terms. Consequently, he was considering the option of with¬
drawing from the political bureau and central committee and felt that the
CC should meet in his absence and come up with clear conclusions on how
to come out of the crisis.20
The comments recorded in the minutes were overwhelmingly supportive
of the central committee's position on joint leadership. Moreover, the
comments show that not only were the members in support of joint leadership,
they were highly critical of the CC for not sharing vital information with
the membership. General member Ronnie Spooner states, "The failure of
the CC to pass on information to the membership shows that the CC was





question of joint leadership, he says, "Bishop as the leader of the party
should be the first person to abide by and uphold democratic centralism.
His failure to do so is nothing but a petty bourgeois manifestation."^^
Most of the other comments reflected the same sentiments; the members
expressed shock at Bishop's position and behavior, Whiteman and Bain
attempted to defend Bishop; Whiteman pointing out that whenever a leader
is missing certain qualities, collective leadership and not joint leader¬
ship solves the problem.23 Bain states that it is necessary that left
opportunism does not replace right opoortunism. He adds that although
he did not have any problem with joint leadership, he felt that some
members had been caucasing against Bishop. He says, "If there is a plot
then it must be crushed."24 The minutes continue, "He said that he knows
that his ideological level is low and the other comrades have a higher
ideological level, but he does not like these things."25
Most of the members rejected Bain's conspiratorial implications. It
was pointed out that his comments reflected his own ideological short¬
comings, since his position rested on the fact that some members seemed
to be ideologically prepared to argue for joint leadership, Peter David
replying to Bain said, "If there was a conspiracy it was conspiracy to
build the party and revolution."26 jhe members then called on Bishop and
Coard to speak. According to the minutes, this culminated in a highly
emotional and positive ending to this meeting.






Cde. Bernard Coard said that today is indeed a historic
day in the life of the party (applause). He said that
the CC meetings he attended from Monday 19th September
surprised him because unlike the past every CC member
was putting forward well thought-out, clear and reasoned
positions on the way forward for building the party and
transforming it into a genuine Marxist-Leninist party.
He said that in the past most CC members would be silent
in CC meetings and seem not to have ideas on how the
party and revolution is to be built. However, now he
witnesses a qualitative difference... He said that in
his opinion the members have spoken from both their heads
and their hearts. Their words have been sincere and it
shows a genuine commitment by the members to struggle for
socialism and lay the basis for the eventual building of
communism... He pledged to the party that he would put
every ounce of effort in building the process and that he
knows that Cde. Bishop would do the same. He said he had
known and work together with Cde. Bishop and that they
both owe it to the party, revolution and the Grenadian
working people to do all that is possible to build the
revolution (applause).
Cde. Bishop stands and embraces Cde. Coard. Cde. Bishop
said that it was correct for him to come to the GM and
stay and hear the views of the party membership. He said
reflecting in isolation would not have been incorrect for
him since he would have seen things in a lopsided manner.
He said that the entire GM had accepted the CC analysis
and decision and this has satisfied his concern. He admitted
to the GM that his response to the CC criticism and decision
was petit bourgeois. He said that the GM has rammed home
that the criticism was correct and so too was the decision.
He said, 'I sincerely accept the criticism and will fulfil
the decision in practice'... He said that his desire now
is to use the criticism positively and march along with
the entire party to build a Marxist-Leninist Party that can
lead the people to socialism and communism. He pledged to
the party that he would do everything to erode his petit
bourgeois traits. He said that he never had difficulties
in working with Cde. Coard and joint leadership would help
push the party and the revolution forward (applause). At
the end of Cde. Bishop's speech, the entire GM broke into
singing the internationale and members filed past to embrace
Cdes. Bishop and Coard.27
After this meeting, it was thought that the internal party crisis
was well on its way to being solved. The next day. Bishop left for
27seabury and McDougall, eds.. The Grenada Papers, p. 315.
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Czechoslovakia and Hungary on an economic aid mission, accompanied by
Louison and Whiteman.28 Once Bishop arrived in Budapest, he informed
Louison, who was part of the advance party and had missed the full mem¬
bership meeting, on the results of the general meeting. Louison was
horrified; he argued forcefully that Bishop's first instinct had been
right — that joint leadership was simply a front for Coard's power grab
and that he would soon be rendered powerless unless he fought back
immediately.29 Bishop was convinced, and resolved to take Louison's
advice. He confided in Cletus St. Paul, his personal bodyguard, that,
"The crisis was a power struggle for no state had joint leadership."20
During this same trip Louison met with a group of Grenadian students and
party members concerning the party crisis, when he allegedly told the
students that the joint leadership issue was not settled and still under
discussion. This meeting was reported back to the CC in Grenada and was
seen as a blatant violation of democratic centralism.
Even greater alarm was sown inside the CC when on the way back from
Eastern Europe, Bishop and his entourage made an unscheduled stop in
Cuba. Bishop was met at the airport by Fidel and Raul Castro and eight
other members of the Cuban Central Committee. Because this was such an
unusually high-powered delegation for such a short visit by a close and
familiar ally, it arose great suspicion that Castro was signaling not
28payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 128.
29George Sanford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story
(Maryland: Madison Books, 1984), p. 157.
28interview with Cletus St. Paul, November 1983 as cited in Payne,
Sutton and Thorndike, p. 128.
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only his support for Bishop but that he was advising him.31 In addi¬
tion, the day before the party was scheduled to arrive back to Grenada,
Thursday, October 6, St. Paul called an unknown member of the CC to say
that Bishop had not accepted joint leadership and allegedly hinted that
'blood will flow.' This was taken to mean that Bishop might be plotting
the physical elimination of his opposition. 32 coard who lived next door
to Bishop moved out of his residence and stayed at the home of the father
of Rupert Roopnarine of the Working Peoples' Alliance of Guyana. Others
took similar precautions.
When Bishop arrived Saturday, October 8, Selwyn Strachan was the
only official to meet him. Bishop related to Strachan that he wanted the
issue of joint leadership put back on the agenda of the CC meeting
scheduled the following Wednesday, October 12. Strachan then gave Bishop
a briefing on party activity in his absence. Strachan reported back to
the CC Bishop's request to reopen the debate of joint leadership. The CC
met in an emergency session on Monday, October 10 and flatly rejected
Bishop's request.
Wednesday, October 12 appeared to be a fundamental turning point in
the party crisis. The party's Political Bureau was scheduled to meet
that morning at 9:00 a.m. However, at 1:00 a.m.. Security Chief Keith
Roberts summoned a meeting of Bishop's security detail from his house.
They were told at this meeting that they should accept orders only from
the CC.33
3lAmbursley, Grenada: Whose Freedom?, p. 71,
32payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 129.
33sanford and Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story, p. 158.
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Another meeting of Peoples' Revolutionary Army (PRA) officers took
place at 7:00 a.m. A resolution was passed which had clear references to
Bishop. They resolved that never would they allow cultism, egoism, the
unreasonable and unprincipled desires of one man to be imposed on the
party.
Therefore, we call on the Central Committee and the entire
party to expel from the party's ranks all elements who do
not submit to, uphold and implement in practice the decision
of the Central Committee and party membership. The Peoples'
Revolutionary Armed Forces Branch of the NJM awaits the de¬
cision and orders of the Central Committee.
By the time of the regular Political Bureau meeting at 9:00 a.m., a
rumor was just beginning to circulate that the Coards were planning to
murder Bishop. When the Political Bureau met, there were three items on
the agenda. The first was the resolution of the Army, the second was an
item called George Louison, and the third was called the present crisis
in the party.
The first item was thrown out on procedural grounds. On the second
item, George Louison was charged with violating democratic centralism.
It was charged that instead of informing the Grenadians on the trip of
the final decision of the CC, Louison tried to encourage party members to
oppose joint leadership. However, these issues were not resolved during
this meeting because it was thought that they should be addressed by the
entire CC.
^^Resolution of the Peoples' Revolutionary Armed Forces Branch of
the New Jewel Movement, St. George's mimeo, p. 2, cited in Seabury and
McDougall, p. 325.
35"Interview with George Louison," Intercontinental Press (April
16, 1984): 212.
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The CC met at 3:00 p.m. that same day. The first item on the agenda
was the charge against George Louison. Primary blame was put on George
Louison for manipulating Bishop and lying to party members in Hungary
about the September 25 meeting. Louison acknowledged that the meeting
took place, but denied any conspiratorial intent.36 Bishop wanted to
know why his security guard, Errol George, had been called to two meetings
to PRA headquarters on matters concerning him (Bishop) but that his other
guard St. Paul was excluded. Bishop then said on the issue of joint lead¬
ership that he had been in a state of 'high emotion' at the general
members meeting on September 25, and on further reflection was not in
favor of joint leadership. He saw joint leadership as a means by which
Coard and the CC would ease him out of power.37 This was totally rejected
by the CC; they reaffirmed that joint leadership was essential.
It was during this meeting that another critical issue arose. The
rumor that the Coards, Strachan and Cornwall were planning to kill Bishop
was rapidly spreading throughout the island. It was reported that
as a result of the rumor a few people had mobilized a section of the St,
Paul militia, seized arms and were headed to Mt, Weldale to protect Bishop
from the Coards.38 Bishop reassured the CC that he did not have any
involvement in the spreading of the rumor. The CC accepted this, but
insisted that Bishop go on the radio to deny the assassination rumor.
The meeting then ended with Louison being expelled from the PB and CC for
violating democratic centralism.
36sanford and Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story, p, 159.
37interview with Cletus St. Paul, November 1983 as cited in Payne,
Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion, p. 130.
38sanford and Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story, p, 160.
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At midnight. Bishop went on the radio and denounced the rumors. He
told the nation that the party was firm and united and that the security
forces were vigorously investigating the sources of the lie.^^ The next
day, October 13, Bishop was summoned to a full party member meeting to
account for the assassination rumor. Late in the afternoon on October
12, while the CC meeting was in session Errol George had made a sworn
statement that he and Bishop's chief bodyguard Cel us St. Paul were
responsible for the rumor, but they had acted under Bishop's instruc¬
tions. George said that he could not bring himself to repeat the lies
and had reported them instead to the security forces.
When Bishop arrived at the meeting, he gave a 45 minute speech in
which he denied all involvement. He said, "With every ounce of honesty
that I can muster, I will not accept responsibility for spreading this
rumor that you are alleging. If I really wanted to cause dissension and
confusion within the party, I could have chosen much more creative ways
to do it than to spread such a vulgar rumor.George was then brought
to the front of the meeting and related how Bishop had instructed him to
go to St. George with a list of names in order to disseminate the very
same rumor.^2 Bishop then declined the right of reply which earlier he
had requested. He remained silent when called upon to speak. Hearing
39ibid.
^^Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson, Revolution and Inter¬
vention in Grenada; the New Jewel l^oye|pent, the United States, and the
Caribbean (London; Westview Press, 1985), p. 73.
^^"Interview with Don Rojas," Intercontinental Press (December 26,
1983): 760.
^^schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada:
the New Jewel Movement, the Unitid States, and the Caribbean, p. 74.
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this evidence and Bishop's refusal to deny the charges by George con¬
vinced the overwhelming majority of the party that Bishop was guilty.
The members were outraged. Bishop in their eyes had disgraced the party
and himself and was beyond redemption. Some felt he should be arrested
and court martial led.
It was then decided for so-called security measures that Bishop be
confined to his house indefinitely, disarmed and his phones cut off.
After this action, it appears that the CC was unsure on how to proceed
with this situation. Bishop on the other hand, now under house arrest,
was convinced that he was going to be poisoned so he refused food. It is
clear that everyone involved knew that at this point the stakes were
high.
Most Grenadians were unaware of Bishop's arrest until the next day,
October 14 when Kendrick Radix, former CC member, informed some civil
servants. Bishop's arrest following the rumor of the plot to kill him,
caused many Grenadians to imagine the worst. By the 15th there were
clear signs of public opposition to Bishop's arrest. On the 15th Radix
organized a demonstration in St. George's market square where he denounced
Coard and told the crowd that if they wanted Bishop free they should seek
out Coard. The next day. Radix was arrested and Austin made a radio
address to the nation. By this time it was acknowledged by the CC that
the situation was getting out of hand, therefore they felt compelled to
negotiate with Bishop to somehow end the crisis. Talks between Selwyn
Strachan representing the CC and Louison representing Bishop began on
^3payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 131.
72
October 15. Mediation was also pursued with Michael Als of the Trinidad
and Tobago Peoples' Popular Movement serving as mediator.Louison
states that during the negotiation he pointed out, "first of all, that
there was no way they could have held power because the people would not
have allowed them to do it. Secondly, that the regional and international
situation did not allow them to do so, and even if they held it, imperialism
would take advantage. Thirdly, that our best ally, Cuba and Socialist
world, could never accept the ideological position that they were taking,
since it was false.
The CC countered by demanding that:
1. The NJM should remain on a socialist path and Maurice
Bishop should do nothing to alter it.
2. Maurice Bishop accept the principles of criticism and
self-critici sm and democratic centralism.
3. Bishop accept that the state is subordinate to the
party.
4. The post of commander-in-chief be abolished and
military affairs be directed by the central committee.
5. Bishop accept responsibility for the crisis.
6. Bishop remain Prime Minister, an ordinary militant of
the NJM, and onlj attend political bureau meetings for
consultations.^®
Louison and Bishop rejected outright the final two points and ques¬
tioned the fourth. They decided that their minimal position should be
that Bishop return to the Central Committee and Political Bureau. In
44ibid., p. 132.
^^"Interview with George Louison," Intercontinental Press (April 16,
1984): 213.
^^Ambursley, Grenada: Whose Freedom?, p. 74.
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addition, they wanted a new mediation team, detention lifted and Bishop
to be allowed to make a public statement
The reaction to these counter proposals is not known because by the
18th of October, Loulson had decided that the CC was stalling for time
and decided to resort to mass activity.Loulson, Whiteman, Housing
Minister Norris Bain and Lyden Ramdhanny formally resigned from the
government on the 18th and began to organize demonstrations.^^ By that
night Loulson was under arrest and Ramdhanny warned to stay home. However,
before he was taken away, Loulson was able to make one last vital communi¬
cation, he says.
And when they announced that they had arrested me and that
I was not to move from the house, I was able to make some
phone calls to key people to tell them I had been arrested,
and that they should come out on the following day...we had
decided to use the 19th as a day to pressure them, to force
them to recognize that they had zero support in the country.
The people were just waiting for the call.^^
The. next day people began to stream in from all over the country.
All shops and offices were closed that morning. Chants of "We want
Maurice," "We want the leader" and "C for Corruption, C for Coard" were
heard down In market square where the people were assembling. There were
even placards reading, "America, we love you!"
Unison Whiteman addressed the crowd and urged the people to take
action. Eventually about 3000 people broke away from the mass of people
47ib1d., p. 75.
Interview with George Loulson," Intercontinental Press (April 16,
1984): 215.
^^Sanford and Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story, p. 163.
50"Interv1ew with George Loulson," Intercontinental Press (April 16,
1984): 215.
74
and marched uphill to Maurice Bishop's house. Once they got to the house,
a couple of warning shots were fired into the air by the guards but the
crowd pushed past the soldiers and took Bishop out. He was then taken by
truck downhill into the town. Many expected him to go to market square
to address the people, but instead the procession made a left turn toward
Fort Rupert. There are conflicting reports on the reasons Bishop decided
to go to the fort. One account says he wanted to use the army transmitter
to broadcast to the people.Another account says that Bishop wanted to
go to the fort in order to capture the arsenal and anti his supporters.52
Whatever the reason. Bishop, accompanied by Jacqueline Creft, Unison
Whiteman, Norris Bain, his brother Fitzroy Bain and union leader Vincent
Noel and hundreds of followers went to the fort where the PRA guards
turned over their weapons to Bishop on his orders. There, they freed
former PRA Chief-of-Staff Major Einstein Louison. Bishop then announced
that Einstein Louison was replacing Hudson Austin as commanding general
of the PRA.53 Vincent Noel then asked who in the crowd were trained
militia where upon he and Einstein Louison began distributing weapons.
The CC which had been meeting at Coard's house reassembled at Fort
Frederick. Bishop telephoned the CC at Fort Frederick where the CC let
it be known they were still willing to negotiate.54 After some discussion
four officers led by Stroude and Lt. Redhead were sent to Fort Rupert to
51payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 134.
52schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada:
The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean, p. 76.
53ibid.
54payne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 134.
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negotiate with Bishop. However, by the time they arrived at Fort Rupert,
Whiteman and Noel made it clear that there was nothing to negotiate.
When the neyotiateing team returned to Fort Frederick empty handed, it
is alleged that at that point the CC sent troops to retake the fort.
While it is not clear what occurred at this point, what is certain is
that three army personnel carriers commanded by Lt. Col. Ewart Layne and
Major Leon Cornwall approached Fort Rupert; shots were exchanged and in
the ensuing melee. Bishop, Noel, Whiteman, Creft and Norris Bain were
killed along with an unknown number of Grenadians.
Summation
In essence, the positions of Rojas and Louison center on their conten¬
tion that the real issue was not democratic centralism but joint leadership.
To support their positions they completely distort the historical record
in order to deflect attention away from democratic centralism to joint
leadership. This is vital for Rojas and Louison because the foundation
of the conspiratorial thesis rests on the acceptance that joint leadership
was the beginning of a diabolical plot by the Coards to take over the
party. If that analytical framework is accepted, and thus far it has been,
then the conceptualization of events which would result in conclusions in
variance with the conspiratorial perspective becomes problematic. However,
the evidence in this chapter vividly demonstates that an analysis freed
from these biases reveals that the suppositions of the conspiratorial
thesis have not been subject to rigorous examination.
Louison charges that between September 15th and October 8th, the so-
called Coard group placed themselves in control of the party and in
control of the military, preparing to remove Bishop from leadership. We
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have found this charge to be completely unfounded. It is clear that when
Bishop left the country on September 26, everyone thought that the party
crisis was over. Bishop had accepted the concept of joint leadership and
had pledged to implement the decision. The CC under Coard's chairmanship
went to work with a new enthusiasm. Coard presented a number of proposals
to solve the party's problems and rebuild its image among the masses.
They included more political education, the allocation of small but
achievable tasks for individual members, the utilization of the talents
of non-party people, and the more efficient and widespread distribution
of party publications. Strachan for one states that, "For the first time
the party realized that party building is a science.With this new
enthusiasm, and the obvious confidence party members had in Coard's
leadership abilities, there does not seem to be any logical reason why
Bishop would change his mind on joint leadership except for egotistic
reasons.
Even when we accept for the purpose of analysis the implication that
circumstances were so fundamentally abnormal that normal party discipline
was not binding on Bishop, the task then would be to delineate those
circumstances. But our analysis of the material does not reveal what
those circumstances could have been. It is clear that not only did the
majority of the CC support the concept of joint leadership, but the over¬
whelming majority of the general membership supported this concept. Con¬
sequently, there was no basis for Bishop's failure to implement the
SSpayne, Sutton and Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
p. 123.
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decision. When the word got back that Bishop had changed his mind on
joint leadership, the disappointment and resentment of party members is
understandable. Therefore, the marginalization of Bishop that Rojas and
Louison point to by using the incident at the airport when only Strachan
showed up to meet Bishop when he returned from Eastern Europe becomes
more comprehensible once the context is added.
On the charge that Coard lined up conditions for Bishop's house
arrest, the evidence points the other way. Even with Cletus St. Paul's
call on the 6th and Bishop's unscheduled 36 hour stop in Cuba, which
caused real concern among the CC, there is still no evidence that the CC
was preparing for the physical elimination of Bishop. On the contrary.
Bishop was placed under house arrest because he was the author of a rumor
which could have resulted in physical harm to a number of NJM militants.
Once Bishop was placed under house arrest, a compromise solution was
still possible. But it was at this point that even more serious violations
of party discipline occurred.
The minority faction of the party decided to openly subvert the
authority of the party. Because this faction correctly preceived that
the masses would rally on the side of Maurice Bishop this was used as
leverage to impose its will on the party. The very fact that negotiations
were forced on the CC by the minority demonstrated the compromised position
of the CC and the open flouting of the principles of democratic centralism.
Whatever way these negotiations turned out, the fact that they took place
would have more than likely resulted in the demise of the NJM as a Marxist-
Leninist party. The demise of the NJM was assured when Bishop decided to
go over the head of the party directly to the masses. The bankruptcy of
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this strategy in a nation where the revolutionary process was in its
infancy was clearly demonstrated during the events of October 19th. When
Louison, Whiteman, and Bain began to organize the people against the
party, all the right wing elements in the country were able to take full
advantage of the resulting chaos.
When Bishop was taken from his house by the masses Rojas says, "Some
of those right wing provocateur elements were very active inside the
crowd, trying to whip up anti-Cuban and anti-communist sentiments.
Vincent Noel, myself and some other comrades picked this up very quickly
and brought it to Maurice's notice as we were moving down Lucas Street to
the fort. He was very concerned about this.But how concerned was
Bishop when at the fort they actually began to hand out weapons to those
same elements. When Einstein Louison, the man Bishop named at^, the fort
to replace Austin as General over the PRA, saw that those right wing
elements were eagerly arming themselves with AK-47's, he decided to leave
the scene.57
The fact that those counter-revolutionary elements were active
that day gives credence to the accounts by Einstein Louison, and neutral
observers such as Michael Als, that the first shots were fired from the
pro-Bishop crowd at the fort.58
55''Interview with Don Rojas," Intercontinental Press (December 26,
1983): 763.
57schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada:
The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean, p. 76.
58lbid., p. 77
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Finally, the events of the last four weeks of the party show that the
conceptualization of these events in terms of a conspiracy obscures and in
fact diminishes the complexity of the situation. With the 'defection* of
Austin to the Coard faction, it is clear that the issue of the integrity
of party principles determined the political alignments inside the party.
It is equally clear that because Bishop and his supporters failed to
abide by the decision of the vast majority of the NJM, they bear a majority
responsibility for the collapse of the NJM.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS
The evidence presented in this study clearly reveals that the basis
of the conspiratorial thesis depends on half truths and gross distortions.
On all three of the major issues which were identified as fundamental to
an explanation of the NJM's collapse, it was found that the conspiratorial
argument was unfounded. It was shown that the perception of a crisis
existing in the party and the revolution was an objective condition, and
that the introduction of joint leadership was seen as a creative attempt
to begin to address the administrative and ideological shortcomings of
the NJM, not only by the majority of the Central Committee, but by the
majority of the party rank and file. It is also equally clear that the
failure of Maurice Bishop and the minority faction to abide by the decision
of the Central Committee, and their subsequent efforts to subvert the
authority of the party, created the situation which led to the collapse
of the NJM.
The violence which occurred on October 19th was not the key factor
in the collapse of the NJM. The delegitimatization of the NJM's hold on
state power began on October 12th, with the dissemination of the rumor
that the Coards were planning to murder Bishop, the rumor that today no
one refutes was started by Bishop. There are only differing interpreta-
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tions of the reasons why he started it.^ The culmination of the process of the
NJM's delegitimatization was completed October 19th, when after Bishop's
house arrest, Louison and the minority faction understanding that Bishop's
position in Grenada was pivotal for maintaining state power, decided to
openly challenge the party for power. When Louison told the Central
Committee that there was no way they could have held power, it was true.
But it was also true that by that challenge. Bishop was destroying the
vanguard that was supposed to lead the nation through the transition to
soci al i sm.
The charge, made during the debate on joint leadership, that Bishop
lacked sufficient brilliance in strategy and tactics is borne out by what
some feel would have been the results had the outcome of Octover 19th
been different. Richard Hart who at the time of the collapse was Grenada's
Attorney General, and had worked with both Bishop and Coard for a number
of years, points out.
An aspect of the Grenada situation to which insufficient con¬
sideration has been given is what would have happened if Bishop
had succeeded in rousing the masses against the Central Com¬
mittee and the party, and had gained personal control. With¬
out the support of the party he would have had to rely heavily
on the support of petty bourgeois elements. Without a Marxist-
Leninist party to guide and lead the revolution what orienta¬
tion would it have taken? However sincerely Bishop may have
believed that the survival of the Revolution depended on his
maintaining his position as sole top leader, would it not,
without the guidance and direction of a Marxist-Leninist
ISome of the right wing accounts of the NJM's collapse characterize
the spreading of the rumor by Bishop as a necessary precaution in light
of the power play by the Coards. See Sanford, p. 158. Hart suggests
that Bishop decided to employ the strategy of Mao Zedong during the
cultural revolution, when Mao decided to go over the heads of the Chinese
Communist Party directly to the masses and rally them to his support.
However, Hart notes tht using this rumor as a tactic to do this was
"bizarre." See In Nobody'a Backyard, p, xxxv.
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party, have lost its working-class socialist orientation? Did
Bishop take this problem into account when he decided to defy
and, if necessary, destroy the party?^
Either Bishop did not take this into account, or he made the decision
that his leadership was more important than the continued integrity of the
NJM as a Marxist-Leninist party, which raises another question: If he
knew he had to destroy the party in order to maintain sole leadership,
then in class terms whose interests was he representing? Some have argued
that Bishop represented the will of the 'masses' and that by opposing
Bishop's desire to remain as sole leader, the Central Committee was in
effect opposing the people and, consequently, undermined their own
authority.
While it is true that it was Bishop's personal popularity which
served as the effective link between the party and the people, the lack
of advance beyond its original populism reveals more about the failure of
the NJM's practice, than the question of internal party discipline which
was the issue here. The implication is that the central committee was in
error to insist that the minority submit to the majority within the context
of party discipline.
This position can be characterized as the 'blame both sides position'
which has emerged recently.^ The argument of this position is that given
Bishop's determination not to implement the joint leadership decision.
^In Nobody's Backyard: Maurice Bishop's Speeches, 1979-1983, A Memorial
Volume, ed., Chris Searle, with an introduction by Richard Hart (London:
Zed Books, 1984), p. xxxvii.
^Hart, for example states that in the attempt to resolve the contra¬
dictions in the party, "The conclusion is inescapable that the revolun¬
tary leaders from Bishop downward, displayed deplorable immaturity in
failing to resolve their disagreement and preserve the unity of the past."
Ibid, p. 37. See also the conclusions of Schoenhals, p. 82.
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the prudent course for the central committee to take would have been to
develop a compromise that both Bishop and other members of the central
committee could accept.
The evidence in this study suggests, however, that this position is
in error for two reasons. First, it does not take into account the
history of the NJM's internal struggle to transform itself into a Marxist-
Leninist party with the high standards of discipline that this implies.
If the course of action recommended above would have been pursued by the
central committee, it may have been more prudent, but the results could
have very easily destroyed all party discipline. It would have been
obvious that there were two sets of discipline, one for the rank and file,
and another for the leadership.
Secondly, the proponents of this position fail to note, as was
brought out in this study, that the event which greatly escalated the
crisis in the party was the dissemination of the assassination rumor.
Until that incident, no one was aware of the incredible lengths the
minority faction was prepared to go to disrupt the party. The dissemina¬
tion of the rumor, with the damaging effect it had on the party, and the
subsequent evidence that revealed Bishop as the author of the rumor would
have made a long lasting compromise extremely difficult. Because of the
domestic situation it occurred in, the spreading of this rumor was the
single most dangerous incident for the NJM as a whole until the events of
October 19th.
In October of 1983, the United States efforts to destabilize the PRG
was at its height. On the international level, the U.S. was attempting
to isolate Grenada politically and economically from her Caribbean neigh¬
bors
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Domestically, a number of incidents had occurred that demonstrated to
the NJM that counter-revolutionary elements had greatly stepped up their
activity. For example, a sharpshooter using a Belgian-made rifle (which
was not used by the armed forces of Grenada) attempted to kill the
Venezuelan Ambassador, Romulo Nucete Hubner. The bullet missed the
ambassador but hit his young daughter in the leg, A few nights later some¬
one entered the home of Hudson Austin's girlfriend and critically injured
her with bullets from an automatic weapon. Austin usually spent his
nights at his girlfriend's home, but had not been there that night. The
NJM was convinced that the bullets were really meant for Austin.^ Unlike
the terroristic activities of 1980,5 these incidents took on an added
significance because they occurred at a point when the domestic support
for the revolution was deteriorating. By the Summer of 1983, the churches
were definitely no longer supportive of the revolution. They openly
criticized the government and encouraged their members not to attend the
meetings of the the NJM's mass organizations. The village militia units
were decreasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. There was even an
incident where the militia formed a protective ring around a church where
an anti-PRG sermon was being preached.®
This was the context in which Bishop allowed the rumor of his pending
assassination to be spread, a situation so volatile that this rumor
^Schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada;
The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean, p. 63,
5a number of incidents occurred during the summer of 1980, the most
serious being the incident at Queen's Park, where a bomb went off during a
PRG rally resulting in the deaths of three people.
®Schoenhals and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada;
The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean, p. 63.
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could have been the incident that the enemies of the NJM were waiting for.
Perry Mars points out,
...The most disastrous event in Grenada was what appeared
to be the deliberate destablization of the government's
leadership leading to th U. S. military intervention in
October 1983...Much of the explanation of the leadership
conflict resides in the skillful sowing of a rumor that
the deputy leader Bernard Coard wanted to kill Maurice
Bishop. Who or what started the rumor is still a mystery,
but a rumor in a small society that lacks extensive and
Mars did not know at the time of this writing what is known today -- that
Maurice Bishop started this rumor. Therefore, the 'blame both sides'
proponents do not take into account the dangerous escalation of the crisis
resulting from the rumor and the narrowing of options for the party once
it became clear that Bishop was responsible for the rumor.
However, the rejection of the arguments above does not suggests that
the Central Committee majority can be completely absolved of any respon¬
sibility for the crisis; to do so would be more ideological than histori¬
cal.® While the Central Committee majority conducted themselves in a
formally correct manner, they failed to take into account the possible
result of significant opposition by Bishop to the joint leadership proposal.
From the moment the joint leadership proposal was introduced, there was a
clear unwillingness not to compromise on any point. Yet, they should
^Perry Mars, "Destabilization and Socialist Orientation in the
English Speaking Caribbean" Latin American Perspectives, 2(Summer 1984):
95.
®A number of Marxist-Leninist organizations are taking this position
in the Caribbean, in particular the United Peoples Movement (JPM) of St.
Vincent, and the Grenadines, and the Peoples Popular Movement (PPM)
of Trinidad and Tobago.
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have been cognizant of the fact that it was the personality of Maurice
Bishop which ensured that the revolution could survive and move forward
under the leadership of the NJM. His popularity with all sectors of
Grenadian society provided the NJM its legitimacy. It was pure fiction
that the people supported the PRG because of some commitment to socialist,
or even progressive ideas. But it was a fiction that many members of the
NJM Central Committee wanted to believe. There was every opportunity for
the Central Committee majority to restructure the leadership in such a
way that both Bishop and Coard could have had the same responsibilities
as laid out in joint leadership proposal without it being called joint
leadership. Whiteman, in fact, proposed that Coard be given specific
responsibilities as Deputy Leader, but this was not considered.
What is being said is that at the point that it was recognized that
fundamental alterations in the leadership had to occur, insufficient
consideration was given to: 1) the response from the people to the
announcement of joint leadership (Bishop's concern about the people
seeing it as the outcome of a power struggle was probably correct), and
2) the tenuous situation the NJM would have found itself in had Bishop
just withdrawn his support from the party. But even though the central
committee may have displayed rigidity and lack of foresight, what gave
the Central Committee credibility and completed obliterated the conspiracy
thesis was the overwhelming support the concept received from the party
membership.
This is the point where the conclusions of this study depart from
those who blame both sides. Once the decision was arrived at by the
Central Committee, supported by the party membership. Bishop's responsi-
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bility was to carry out the decision in practice or resign; there was no
room for any other compromise.
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